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Abstract 
Internal control of foreigners is a measure of migration control employed by the 
Swedish state, with two main goals: to monitor that no foreigners reside in the 
country without legal permits, and to find and detain foreigners who are to be 
deported. Charged by the government to increase efficiency in expulsions, the 
Migration Board, The National Police Board and the Prison and Probation Service 
initiated the cooperation project REVA in 2009-2014, which this thesis takes as 
its point of departure. Through a Foucauldian and discourse analytical approach to 
the law and policy, the study situates internal control within European politics on 
migration and free movement as one of the Schengen Agreement’s compensatory 
measures. The control is simultaneously located within a specific national 
biopolitics and its historical exclusions, in particular of the Roma. Critically 
engaging with securitisation, exceptionalism and borders, the thesis shows how 
internal control of foreigners is a contemporary bordering practice that extends the 
securitised moment of border crossing into everyday life across society. The 
control relies on a combination of large-scale surveillance cooperation, biometric 
registration and identity management, and a continuous policing of belonging as 
well as on the contested limit between the ‘citizen’ and the ‘foreigner’. 
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1 Introduction 
Malmö, at the square of Möllan, a dark November afternoon. A police officer is 
checking that bikers have correct lamps, and at the same time asking for 
identification. He is looking for undocumented migrants and refugees in hiding 
from the authorities. Meanwhile on the train across the bridge between Malmö 
and Copenhagen, imagine an Iraqi man in a suit opening excel files on his laptop 
because if he looks like a businessman commuting, the border police will not 
question him. He might be trying to get into the country to apply for asylum. Or 
waiting for his application to be processed and not allowed to cross the border 
meanwhile, but wanting to see friends or family on the other side. He might be an 
undocumented migrant. Or maybe he has been a European citizen for ten years 
and has grown sick and tired of repeatedly having to prove his belonging and legal 
status in public. This time, the border guards pass him by.  
In 2009, the Swedish government tasked the Migration Board and the National 
Police Board with increasing the number and speed of expulsions 
(Ju2009/10323/SIM, §3.1). The same year, the Migration Board, the National 
Police Board and the Prison and Probation Service initiated the project REVA 
(Rättssäkert effektivt verkställighetsarbete), in translation “Legal Certainty and 
Effective Enforcement”.  “Enforcement” in this context is bureaucratic shorthand 
for enforcement or execution of a decision to refuse an application for asylum or a 
residence permit, and in practice it means removing a person from the country 
with the use or threat of force: expulsions and deportations. In contrast to the term 
enforcement, the Swedish word “verkställighet” carries no direct implications of 
force; rather it sounds like an everyday apolitical procedure. It was only in late 
2012 and early 2013 that the project came into focus of public attention and 
debate, following media coverage of the way police were making arrests at 
weddings, outside children’s psychiatric centres and during ticket controls in the 
Stockholm subway (Stark 2012, Röstlund 2012).  
Identity controls in public spaces are not, however, a new phenomenon 
emerging with the project REVA. The proper legal name for this type of control 
in Sweden is internal control of foreigners and it has been part of police work 
since the early 1900:s, though its aim and focus has shifted over time. In the early 
twentieth century, the controls were explicitly meant to maintain the racial 
integrity of the Swedish nation. After Sweden entered the Schengen agreement 
that opened the borders between member states, internal controls gained more 
importance (Hydén - Lundberg 2004:266). This coincided with the growth of 
virulent anti-immigration debates in Sweden and across Europe in the 1990s and 
onwards. Immigration came to be discussed as a security threat connected to 
trafficking, smuggling and international organized crime. In the 2000s, the 
securitisation of the migrant Other gained momentum through the discourse on 
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the global “war on terror”, and across Europe and in Sweden today in the 
mobilisation of populist racist, fascist and neo-Nazi parties and extra-
parliamentary movements that draw on Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and 
antiziganism in various ways. 
One peculiarity of internal control of foreigners is that these controls are 
explicitly aimed at identifying non-citizens who do not have a legal right to be on 
Swedish territory, while police are also prohibited from carrying out controls 
based on skin colour or appearance. Numerous authors and debaters have argued 
that despite this prohibition, the controls are in themselves always discriminatory 
and likely to lead to racial profiling, and do not uphold the rule of law (see for 
instance Hydén –Lundberg 2004, Khemiri 2013). 
Research on internal controls of foreigners in Sweden is limited. Following 
the way police methods for identifying and detaining undocumented migrants 
were hotly debated in national media during 2013, some NGOs and journalists 
have published reports. As of yet, little to nothing has been published in terms of 
academic research on REVA. Many student theses from last year take on the 
project from two main angles: discourse analysis of representations in the media 
debate or the policy itself; or focusing on the legality of the police controls and 
whether they are infringing on the rights of the individual or are discriminatory in 
nature. A PhD dissertation from 2004 by Sophie Hydén and Anna Lundberg 
offers a thorough analysis of the practice of internal controls of foreigners in 
Swedish police work including a large-scale field study following police officers 
carrying out these controls, reaching the conclusion that they inevitably fall short 
of norms of equality and the rule of law (Hydén – Lundberg 2004). Notably, the 
dissertation was written before the current Swedish Aliens Act entered into force 
in 2006, and long before REVA. 
Lacking in the literature is further research into why the controls are carried 
out, which role they are meant to fulfil and how they come to be perceived as 
necessary. Furthermore, the connection to the Schengen Agreement and European 
border policies needs more research. The project REVA in itself is equally topical 
for study in political science, as a case of cooperation between government 
agencies and as a divisive issue in public opinion. Internal control of foreigners 
can simultaneously be understood as a deeply European phenomenon, as one of 
the Schengen Agreement’s compensatory measures, and as a nationally specific 
measure with long historical roots. It moves the border controls’ sorting function 
from the territorial outer border into the social spaces inside the country, thereby 
actualising issues of belonging, understandings of national identity, and the 
“outsider within” – the postcolonial, the securitised, racialized and Othered.  
1.1 Purpose and research questions 
The purpose of the thesis will be to examine the practice of internal control of 
foreigners in Europe and specifically in Sweden. Focusing on how internal control 
is made necessary and what and whom it strives to control, the thesis shall 
  3 
critically engage with debates on securitisation and borders by drawing on 
poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives.  
 
• How is internal control contributing to or in conflict with European polices 
of free movement, and how can this process be understood in terms of 
governmentality and securitisation/desecuritisation? 
 
• How is ‘the foreigner’ discursively constructed in relation to internal 
control? 
 
• How is ‘the border’ understood and reconfigured in the practice of internal 
control? 
 
This thesis will address these questions through a discourse analysis of Swedish 
law and policy documents on internal control of foreigners, paying particular 
attention to how it interlinks with European policies. 
1.2 Introducing the case: the Swedish legal framework 
for internal control of foreigners 
Internal control of foreigners in Sweden is mandated and regulated by laws and 
ordinances. The specific legal grounding for the control is to be found in the 
Aliens Act (SFS 2005:716), chapter 9 section 9, that states that “It is the duty of 
an alien staying in Sweden, when requested to do so by a police officer, to present 
a passport or other documents showing that he or she has the right to remain in 
Sweden.” Furthermore, an alien is also required to provide information about their 
stay in the country on request from either the Migration Board or a police 
authority, and may be collected by the police to do so if necessary. The Coast 
Guard have the responsibility for the control in connection to maritime traffic. 
Controls “may only be undertaken if there is good reason to assume that the alien 
lacks the right to remain in this country or there is otherwise special cause for 
controls” (SFS 2005:716 8a§ 9 chap.).  
The Aliens Act is supplemented by the Aliens Ordinance 2006:97, which 
contains more precise regulations on control measures such as registration of 
foreign guests in hotels and other commercial accommodation, employers’ 
responsibility to ensure that foreign workers have correct permits, and on certain 
authorities’ duty to report on interactions with foreigners. The framework for the 
control is further specified in the National Police Board’s regulations and general 
guidelines on internal control of foreigners, from here on referred to as RPSFS 
2011:4. In the regulations, internal control of foreigners is defined as an action 
undertaken with support of §9 chap. 9 of the Aliens Act. The focus of the control 
is defined as 1) monitoring that foreigners do not reside or work in the country 
without fulfilling the requirements for doing so, and 2) searching for foreigners 
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regarding whom there is a decision on refusal of entry or expulsion that shall be 
enforced (RPSFS 2011:4 §3). The Aliens Act and RPSFS 2011:4 refer to the 
Schengen cooperation and the 2004 EU directive on the right to move and reside 
freely.  
As mentioned, internal control of foreigners in Sweden came to be the centre 
of public debate in Sweden in 2013 in connection with the project REVA that was 
started in 2009 and is meant to conclude in June 2014. The first part of REVA 
was a preliminary study in 2010, followed by a pilot project testing new methods 
in Malmö in 2010-2011, before the new methods were implemented across the 
country starting in May 2012 (Migrationsverket 2012). The main focus of the 
project is on streamlining and standardising administrative procedures for 
workflow and documentation, and to improve cooperation between the authorities 
and within them. It is co-financed by the European Return Fund and coordinated 
by the Migration Board. Internal control of foreigners is not synonymous with 
REVA and neither does the project extend the police’s legal mandate for control, 
a public perception that the Migration Board is keen to counteract 
(Migrationsverket 2014). The project and the control are however connected, 
since the rationale for REVA is to increase expulsions and internal control is 
precisely a method for finding those who are to be expulsed.  
1.3 Academic context: studying migration control 
Migration and migration control have often been studied within political science 
and international relations as a matter of geopolitical security or regulation and 
management for the benefit of the state. The concept of migration, understood as 
individuals crossing borders, depends on the “deployment of a claim by the state 
to a sovereign right to designate who are its citizens and who are not” (Guild 
2009:11). This means that one fruitful approach to studying migration is through 
analysis of the categories and strategies employed by the state to designate 
individuals as citizens, foreigners, tourists, immigrants, legal/illegal/irregular and 
so on, making it possible to challenge state-centrism by drawing particular 
attention to the ways in which the individual can and does contest the 
categorisations of the state. (Guild 2009)  
Poststructuralist perspectives challenge the mainstream by deconstructing its 
taken-for-granted concepts and assumptions, questioning for instance the 
naturalised equivalence between a state, a bordered geographical territory and a 
population. Within the European Union context, conventional migration studies 
has been criticised for a tendency to mostly study sub-fields and miss the linkages 
between policy areas and the long historical connections between European 
integration and migration. This includes treating intra-European mobility as an 
entirely separate phenomenon from migration. Defining who is not a migrant is as 
political as defining who is (Hansen 2008:20-21), which is why this thesis does 
not use the terminology of European mobility.  
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The context of a specific migration policy can be termed a migration regime, 
here loosely used as involving e.g. shared norms, institutions, agreements, related 
policies and practices. The current global migration regime can be understood as 
stemming from a broad consensus around fundamental normative commitments in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: that every individual has a right to a 
nationality, to leave their country, to become a refugee and to return to their 
country. However, there is not a corresponding right to entry: that is seen as the 
domain of every state to regulate, which is also fundamental to the regime. This 
sets up the moment of entry into the territory as the moment when the state can 
control its population by making discretionary judgements on who is allowed to 
enter, positing the border as a classical expression of sovereignty. (Salter 
2006:175) From an institution-focused perspective, a binding global migration 
regime is still very distant. However, the cooperation on migration within the 
European Union is comparatively quite highly institutionalized, and has focused 
to a large degree on irregular migration (Kalm 2010, Jørgensen 2010). 
Within the realm of security studies, one particularly important approach for 
studies of migration is the concept of securitisation arising from the Copenhagen 
School. Coming out of the general widening and deepening of security studies, 
Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver among others launched the concept of societal 
security in the early 1990s, explicitly linking migration and national identity to 
security, so that for instance immigration can be understood as a threat to national 
social cohesion and thereby to the society. Securitisation refers to the process of 
making something a security issue, by presenting it as an existential threat (Buzan 
– Hansen 2009:213-214). This means that a development need not be an actual 
threat to the existence of a state or society for it to be perceived and acted upon as 
such, if e.g. the norms, ideas and behaviours that are believed to be integral to 
societal/national identity are seen as becoming insecure (Muller 2011:102). As a 
result, the securitised issue is framed as “a special kind of politics or above 
politics”, which authorises the state to deal with it with particular force and speed 
(Buzan et al. 1998:23). Crucially, invoking something as a security threat that 
requires decisive action does not only legitimate the use of power by certain 
actors, but also assigns a particular responsibility for handling the threat to those 
actors (Hansen 2006:35). Securitisation theory for Buzan and Wæver has roots in 
both traditionalist IR security debates, in speech act theory, and in an Schmittian 
understanding of security and exceptional politics (Buzan – Hansen 2009:213). 
The post-9/11 global “war on terror” has had a significant impact both on 
practices of border controls and surveillance, and studies thereof. Within security 
studies, constructivist, feminist and poststructuralist scholars linked politics of 
identity to an increasing concern with technology, surveillance and profiling; and 
critically engaged with the use and normalisation of exceptionalism (Buzan – 
Hansen 2009:248-249). This thesis draws on this stream of security studies.  
It is striking in Buzan and Hansen’s account of the discipline of security 
studies that while there is a fair amount of post-colonial analysis of the colonial 
and Orientalist underpinnings in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (2009:244), 
they seem curiously absent in the discussion on the linkages between technology, 
securitisation and identity. Generally, while postcolonial perspectives are not 
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entirely absent from the subfield of security studies, neither have they received 
much attention and security studies continue to be haunted by a “Western-
centrism” that “mistakes Western experiences for the universal” (Bilgin 
2010:619). Through a critical engagement with Buzan and Hansen, Pinar Bilgin 
points to the lack of engagement with insecurities in the South as not only a blind 
spot of the discipline but in fact constitutive of both practices of security and 
studies of it in the West and non-Western world (2010). 
As such, post-colonial perspectives can bring into focus how European 
identity and governmental practices are constituted in relation to the postcolonial 
world, and how migration and control are shaped by colonial legacies. (In)security 
governance has been shaped by colonial encounters, using colonies as 
“modernity’s laboratories of organized violence”, where e.g. Police forces in 
Britain and France emerged in continuous exchange of knowledge and practices 
between the domestic and imperial spheres (Hönke – Müller 2012:387-388). 
Sweden in particular is not one of the larger former colonial powers but does have 
a mostly overlooked colonial history of its own. This includes the colonies of New 
Sweden around the Delaware River in North America, and Saint Barthélemy in 
the Caribbean, as well as a distinctly colonial relationship to the indigenous Sámi 
in the northern parts of Scandinavia. In addition, Sweden is of course implicated 
in the global economic systems historically built on colonial exploitation (see e.g. 
Naum – Nordin 2013). The need for postcolonial analysis is even clearer in 
relation to the European Union as a whole, since it emerged in parallel to large-
scale decolonisation struggles and partially through a conviction that European 
unification and economic recovery could only happen through a joint preservation 
of European colonial influence in Africa (Hansen – Jonsson 2013). How this 
thesis uses postcolonial theory is outlined in section 2.3. 
1.4 Disposition 
The first chapter introduces the study and its purpose and research questions, the 
case and the academic context. The second chapter contains the methodological 
framework of the study, introduces discourse theory and how to combine it with 
postcolonial perspectives and central Foucauldian concepts, wrapping up with the 
research design, material and limitations. The analysis is then structured after the 
three research questions: chapter 3 considers the role of internal control in 
European free movement policies and processes of governmentality, securitisation 
and desecuritisation. Chapter 4 focuses on who is targeted by the control and how 
‘the foreigner’ is constituted in internal control. Chapter 5 turns to how ‘the 
border’ itself can be understood through the practice of internal control. The final 
chapter sums up the conclusions of the study and its further implications.  
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2 Methodological and theoretical 
framework 
 
This chapter presents the framework of the thesis, which is poststructuralist and 
discourse analytical. It draws on the work of Michel Foucault, and Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse theory, which is useful for focusing on discursive 
struggle and change, as well as dominant patterns and continuity. Particularly 
important theoretical concepts from Foucault are introduced in section 2.2, 
followed by a discussion of poststructuralism and postcolonial theory. For the 
more concrete research design, I draw upon Lene Hansen’s framework for 
discourse analysis in Security as practice (2006).  
A Foucauldian discourse analysis, or in his terms a genealogy, investigates a 
concept or an element, often one we think of as having no history, as being a 
universal category, to show how that element has been shaped through a particular 
and contradictory history that also reveals the mutual dependency of truth-making 
and power. There is an argument to be made for studying policy and particularly 
law from a Foucauldian perspective. In the lecture series Society Must Be 
Defended, Foucault argues for studying law as sedimented power relations, and 
not only reading the law as a direct expression of sovereign power. “Rather than 
privileging the law as manifestation of power, we would do better to try to 
identify the different techniques of constraint that it implements” (Foucault 2003 
[1976]:266). Foucault here argues for a view of the judiciary system/field as a 
permanent vehicle for relations of domination, not only relations of sovereignty, 
and techniques of subjugation (Foucault 2003 [1976]:27). Though not very 
commonly done, Foucauldian tools can be used to study both socio-legal 
techniques and the law/legal systems themselves to bring into focus both the 
politics and the historicity of law (Neal 2011:58, Valverde 2011).  
This means that studying the law and the operations of the judiciary system 
may grant us insight into wider social structures of power and inequality, rather 
than seeing it only as an expression of the absolute power of the sovereign state. 
Judith Butler does this in her analysis of the infinite detention of prisoners in 
Guantanamo Bay, when she examines the interaction of governmentality and 
sovereignty in states of exception and the US Government’s use of and 
circumvention of law. Butler states that she is not solely interested in rule of law 
per se, but also in how power as governmentality uses law as a tactic (Butler 
2004:93-95). It is in such a way that this thesis is concerned with studying the law 
around internal controls of foreigners: as a part of social relations of domination 
and control, and as a powerful tactic.  
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2.1 Introducing discourse theory 
Discourse theory belongs within a poststructuralist mode of thought, not seeking 
to establish causal relationships but rather focusing on the constitutive importance 
of discourse and representations. It is post-structural in the sense that it assumes 
that while language structures the social world, social phenomena are never 
finished or total. Because meaning can never be totally fixed, there can always be 
struggle over definitions of identity and society. These struggles will have social 
effects (Winther Jørgensen – Phillips 2002:24). It follows that the focus of 
discourse analysis will be to trace the discursive struggles over meaning and their 
effects. Discourse theory understands language as a relational system of signs, 
where meaning is established through a series of juxtapositions. An “I” can only 
exist in relation to a “you”, an “inside” in relation to an “outside”, and so on. For 
deconstructionists, Western Enlightenment philosophy and the schools of thought 
following it is built upon these binaries, where one side of the opposition is valued 
over the other: civilised over barbarian, man over woman, rational over emotional 
and so on. If “Western” is defined in opposition to “Oriental”, then the “Oriental” 
can only be what the “Western” is not and vice-versa. (Derrida 1976, 1978, 
Spivak 1999:423-431, Mohanty 2003:41)  
Laclau and Mouffe define a discursive formation following Foucault as 
“regularity in dispersion”, which they understand as an “ensemble of differential 
positions”. It is from this that necessity derives – the regularity of a system of 
structural positions that are defined in relation to one another. Necessity is the 
attempt to fix meaning within a structure. (Laclau – Mouffe 2001:105-6, 114) If a 
is defined in opposition to b, then b necessarily is what a is not. Necessity is not, 
however, an inevitability or a transcendental phenomenon. It is more productive 
to understand necessity as being in itself a claim, a discursive tactic, or a dispersed 
political discourse and practice, such as the argued necessity of an illiberal 
political practice or state of exception (Neal 2011:47-48).  
The system of a discourse is not structured by any external, underlying 
principle. It can be signified as a totality, but no discourse is ever a fully fixed and 
closed system, which is why change is possible (Laclau – Mouffe 2001:106). The 
meaning attached to a sign is always contingent, possible but not inevitable. 
Discourses attempt to structure signs “as if all signs had a permanently fixed and 
unambiguous meaning within a total structure” (Winther Jørgensen – Phillips 
2002:33), and the same logic applies to the social field where we act as if society 
had a given and unambiguous structure. Importantly, the understanding of 
discourses as contingent does not mean that everything is always in flux or that 
change is easy. The most stable areas of discourse are termed the objective; a 
sedimented field with a long series of naturalised social arrangements that we take 
as given and generally don’t question. In contrast, the political is discourse under 
struggle, where meanings and practices are controversial and questioned. 
(Winther Jørgensen – Phillips 2002:55) 
Differing from Foucault and for example critical discourse analysis, 
discourse theory as conceptualised by Laclau and Mouffe draws no clear 
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distinction between discursive and non-discursive fields or elements. They claim 
that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, but do not deny that 
things or events such as an earthquake or a violent conflict exist externally to 
thought. The point is that we can only understand objects and events through 
discourse, through the social meanings assigned to them. That is, discourse tells 
us if an earthquake is a natural phenomenon or an expression of the wrath of God. 
For Laclau and Mouffe this is not to claim that “reality” is immaterial, but rather 
to “affirm the material character of every discursive structure”. This materiality of 
discourse also means that Laclau and Mouffe include institutions, rituals and 
practices in the discursive logic that articulates a system of differences. (Laclau – 
Mouffe 2001:107-109) In other words, it is very far from arguing that linguistic 
phenomena create everything else, which seems a common misunderstanding. 
Following this argument, I argue that focusing on discourse does not mean 
abandoning the very real effects on politics, societies and individual peoples’ lives 
in question for instance in migration and border control policy. Rather, focusing 
on discourse allows us to see how these effects come about, how they are 
understood, legitimated, made necessary, how they are concealed or become 
objects of political struggle. 
2.2  Power, governmentality and biopolitics 
 
“Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates […] It is 
never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is 
never appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be 
appropriated. Power functions. Power is exercised through networks, and 
individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are in a position 
to both submit to and exercise this power. […] In other words, power 
passes through individuals. It is not applied to them.” (Foucault 2003 
[1976]:29).  
 
The first and central take-away from Foucault is of course his understanding of 
power cited above; as something that circulates and functions, as productive, not 
only repressive, as something that always interacts with individuals – which 
means that there can never be power without resistance.  
A second central concept for Foucauldian studies is governmentality: the 
dispersed technology, knowledge and practice of governing. It operates through 
bureaucratic and managerial procedures, state and non-state institutions and 
discourses. It can be “broadly understood as mode of power concerned with the 
maintenance and control of bodies and persons, the production and regulation of 
persons and populations, and the circulation of goods insofar as they maintain and 
restrict the life of the population.” (Butler 2004:52). Foucault distinguished 
governmentality from the problem of sovereignty which consists primarily in 
preserving principality and territoriality: in other words with the state/the 
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sovereign maintaining itself as the highest authority and effective power within a 
given territory. Sovereignty functions to legitimate the state and its use of power 
in a self-referential way, without any solid external ground. Butler argues that 
when the question of the legitimacy of the state stops being asked for lack of an 
answer, “the problem of legitimacy becomes less important than the problem of 
effectivity” and the state can then survive as a site of power through 
governmentalization (Butler 2004:95). Sovereignty does not necessarily disappear 
when governmentality emerges: it is an analytic distinction between two modes of 
power that can co-exist, especially in relation to discipline. Sovereignty can 
emerge reconfigured within governmentality, such as when officials charged with 
administrative decisions hold the power over life and death of individuals. 
Foucault also traces the shift from sovereign power in another way, as 
“biopower”. It is a mode of power that has shifted from the sovereign power that 
“took life and let live” to a power that consist in “making live and letting die” 
(Foucault 2003 [1976]:247). Foucault places the emergence of biopolitics in 
Europe in the late 19th century, where “biopolitics deals with the population, with 
the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and 
political, as a biological problem and as power’s problem.” (Foucault 2003 
[1976]:245). As such, biopower deals with the population: with statistics and 
increasing knowledge through surveillance and monitoring in order to build up 
profiles and define norms. In the emergence of biopower it is deeply connected to 
medical discourse, identifying the insiders that society needs to be defended from, 
those who are “abnormal in behaviour, species or race” (Elden 2011:25). This 
contrasts with the disciplining power of institutions such as the military, schools 
and prisons that function through tight control and surveillance over bodies in a 
physically limited space (Foucault 1979). Similarly to the analytic distinction 
between sovereignty and governmentality, disciplining power and normalising 
biopower are not to be understood as two entirely separate modes of power in 
Foucault’s work, either within different contexts or in time. Rather, they are “two 
conjoined modes of the functioning of knowledge/power” (Elden 2011:25). This 
means that it is possible for power to function in several modes in parallel. In the 
contemporary era, that can mean that power in migration control can operate both 
through electronic biometric registration on one hand and physical removal of 
bodies from the territory on the other.  
When Foucault traces the emergence of biopower in the late 20th century, he is 
not explicitly concerned with colonisation or empire, but in his lectures in Society 
Must Be Defended, race figures continuously as a “pivotal mechanism” for 
biopolitics and biopower relations. Biopolitics determines which life is productive 
for “species life” and should be promoted, and which should not. In other words, 
biopolitics needs sorting mechanisms, and race has been a principal one (Dillon 
2011:179). This does not mean that biopolitics in itself consists in or promotes a 
specific racist doctrine, but that it is a complex of political rationalities and 
governmental techniques that require race for their operationalization. As Dillon 
argues, biopolitics and race are both shifting and developing concepts, and the 
racism that takes place in contemporary liberal democracies is still racism when it 
takes place through governing by socio-technical systems instead of through 
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outright proclamations of racial supremacy. “If you biopoliticise you will 
racialise, however subtly or opaquely recorded in your biopoliticised operating 
technologies of power that racialising may be.” (Dillon 2011:188). In another 
phrasing, contemporary biopolitics is “the management of life whereby the 
merging of body and technology, together with the segmentation of society, is 
precisely what is at stake” (Ajana 2013:2). Crucial in this formulation that Bithaj 
Ajana develops to study “biometric citizenship” is the understanding that 
technological systems are not innocent, but rather deeply involved in segmenting 
society and run through with differential power dynamics. 
Biopolitics and governmentality can also be understood in relation to and 
through the framework of security.  “Foucault historicises and governmentalizes 
security. As a dispositif de sécurité, security is an ensemble of mechanisms by 
which the biopolitical imperative to make life live is operationalized 
governmentally.” (Dillon – Neal 2011:12). The discussion of security continues in 
chapter 3. 
2.3  Poststructuralism, postcolonial theory and 
Eurocentrism 
When combining theoretical and methodological frameworks, it is crucial to 
consider their compatibility in terms of ontological and epistemological 
assumptions and internal logics. In regards to discourse theory’s overarching 
understanding of the social as discursive, this needs careful consideration and 
possibly translation of other theories’ into discursive terms (Winther Jørgensen – 
Phillips 2002:156). Generally speaking, poststructuralists and postcolonial 
scholars share an understanding of society as socially and relationally constituted, 
which is very compatible with a discourse theory framework. In kind, identities 
are understood as discursive, political, relational and social (Hansen 2006:6). In 
discourse theory, because social identities are understood as purely relational they 
can never be fully constituted, just as and because no discourse is ever fully fixed 
and closed to change. Identity is understood as identification with a subject 
position within a discourse. Since every individual could identify with several 
different subject positions, the subject is overdetermined. (Laclau – Mouffe 
2001:111, 116-122; Winther Jørgensen – Phillips 2002:43) Postcolonial theory 
often traces the specific ways identity is constituted under conditions or legacies 
of colonialism, and its differential effects for hegemonic and 
marginalised/racialised subjectivities.  
There is a distinction to be made between the postcolony as the nation-states 
that were “once governed by, for, and from elsewhere”, and the postcolonial 
condition that has global analytical reach and focuses on the legacies of colonial 
forms of rule, knowledge production and subjectification processes (Hönke – 
Müller 2012:385-387). It is the latter, the postcolonial condition, that is relevant 
here and that is the analytic focus of important parts of the postcolonial theory 
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literature, such as how Homi Bhaba uses the concept of hybridity to capture how 
colonial encounters shape subjectification processes both in the (post)colonies and 
in the heart of the empires of the western world (Bhaba 1994). Postcolonial 
studies also criticise the Eurocentrism of contemporary critical thought. A 
paradigmatic study is Edward Said’s analysis of Orientalism, showing how 
knowledge and power are mutually dependent throughout the history of Western 
imperialism in the Arab world (Said [1979] 2003). Said has in turn been criticised 
for staying within the tradition that he is criticising, in that he still comes from 
within Western academia to study the Other, the outsider, rather than coming from 
below, from the margins (Young 2004:167, Bhaba 1994).  
Orientalism built on scientific racism and imperialist ambition is not the only 
incarnation of Eurocentrism, however. Eurocentrism can also be found in for 
example paternalistic anti-imperialism, that shares the Eurocentric metanarratives 
that international theory builds itself upon (Hobson 2012). Critique of 
Eurocentrism is a critique of universalism, drawing attention to how universalistic 
thought is always unstable and modified by the particular histories of where it was 
formulated – such as post-Enlightenment colonial Europe. Simply put as Dipesh 
Chakrabarty argues, critical thought can fight and carry prejudice at the same time 
because it remains related to particular places and histories (Chakrabarty 2008). 
The critique of universalism and essentialism is of course central to 
poststructuralism that deconstructs seemingly stable and enduring categories, and 
often goes hand in hand with critiques of Eurocentrism, such as how Derrida’s 
famous deconstruction in Of Grammatology (1976) focuses on ‘ethnocentrism’. It 
can be argued that most generally Derrida’s deconstruction is a deconstruction of 
“the concept, the authority, and the assumed primacy of, the category of ‘the 
West’” (Young 2004:50-51). This does not mean that poststructuralism is exempt 
from Eurocentrism, neither in its choice of perspective and analytical emphasis or 
in the issue that the most influential theorists are from and/or educated at the most 
prestigious institutions in Europe.  
A tendency to treat European societies “as if these were self-contained 
histories complete in themselves, as if the self-fashioning of the West was 
something that occurred only within its self-assigned geographical boundaries” 
and utterly disregard the “colonial theatre” and its legacies is another common 
incarnation of Eurocentrism (Chakrabarty 2008:45), and one that Foucault should 
be and has been criticised for (e.g Stoler 1995). Another influential postcolonial 
engagement with Foucault is Achille Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics, showing 
how especially in the colonies and under states of exception, the politics of letting 
die characterises the biopolitical economy as much as the biopower of making life 
live (Mbembe 2003). Necropolitics can also be employed to understand 
immigration law as a mode of biopolitical control that does not have to sentence a 
life to death in order to let it die (Butler – Athanasiou 2013:167). 
I attempt to conduct my analysis in a manner that is informed by postcolonial 
perspectives and critical to the Eurocentric tendency to treat Europe as a unified 
and exceptional subject of history. Concretely speaking, the analysis considers the 
Eurocentrism in binaries underpinning migration control: citizen/foreigner, 
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legal/illegal, and how these are connected to colonial/Eurocentric/racist discourses 
limiting who “the European” is.   
2.4  Research design and material 
As Lene Hansen argues, “adopting a non-causal epistemology does not imply an 
abandonment of theoretically rigorous frameworks, empirical analyses of ‘real 
world relevance,’ or systematic assessments of data and methodology” (2006:5). 
Hansen’s framework for discourse analysis is developed for IR-studies of foreign 
policy, and specifically for tracing the constitutive importance of identity 
constructions of Self and Others. It provides practical guidelines and thorough 
consideration of choices of research strategies, models and choice of materials for 
discourse analysis. I make use of and adapt her framework. Border control and 
even more so internal control occupy a peculiar position in between foreign and 
internal policy, concerned as they are with delimiting the state itself. This makes 
Hansen’s framework an interesting choice. Even though identifying the identities 
at play in the discourse is not the main focus of my analysis, it is a useful 
analytical backdrop in line with the theories used.  
Hansen develops three intertextual research models for discourse analysis with 
varying scope, focusing on 1) official discourse, 2) wider foreign policy debate, 
3A) cultural representations, and 3B) marginal political discourses. The first 
model is the one of interest here. Its analytical focus is on governments, heads of 
state, officials and international institutions. The objects of analysis are official 
texts and their direct and secondary intertextual links to supportive texts and 
critical texts. The goal of analysis for this model is identifying the stabilization of 
official discourse through intertextual links, and the response of official discourse 
to critical discourses. (Hansen 2006:64) The concept of intertextuality is drawn 
from Julia Kristeva, and refers to the way texts reference and mediate previous 
texts. Hansen combines discourse theory with this concept to develop more 
practical tools. Intertextuality can be traced in its different forms, a) explicit: 
quotes, references, and b) implicit: secondary sources, catchphrases and 
conceptual intertextuality. (Hansen 2006:55, 57) 
Discourse analysis according to this model gives epistemological and 
methodological priority to the study of primary texts such as policy and official 
statements, but secondary sources are important for context or can become 
primary texts in their own right by being referred to by the primary texts. All of 
these texts need to be actively selected by the researcher. Hansen sets up a matrix 
for text selection along two lines: temporal location and type of material. First, 
texts should primarily be from the time of study, complemented with historical 
material for conceptual histories/genealogies. Secondly, the focus is on frequently 
quoted key texts that function as intertextual nodes, complemented with a wider 
general material that provides context. For the general material she gives three 
further selection criteria, in that the texts should: 1) contain clear articulations, 2) 
be widely read and attended to, 3) have formal authority. (Hansen 2006:82-83)  
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The time of study in my case is centred on the event of the project REVA, that 
is 2009-2014. Key texts are official policy documents from the Swedish 
Government, the Migration Board and the National Police Board on the REVA 
project, as well as the Swedish law; particularly the relevant sections of the new 
Aliens Act from 2006 and regulations on internal control of foreigners. Important 
historical material for the conceptual history include motions and protocols of 
parliamentary debate, government propositions and commissioned reports, 
particularly those concerned with Sweden’s membership of the Schengen Area. 
As a second level, key texts are European Union policy documents on the 
Schengen Area and free movement in Europe. The majority of the documents I 
have analysed are in Swedish, and when I quote them it is in my own translation. 
Certain documents (e.g. the Aliens Act) do exist in an English version published 
by the Swedish Government, though the translations come with a disclaimer that 
they are not to be considered official and may be incomplete or not up to date, and 
therefore I take certain liberties with their terminology. There is no established 
translation for “inre utlänningskontroll”. I have chosen to use the term internal 
control of foreigners rather than internal control of aliens, because I consider the 
Othering inherent in “alien” to be much stronger than in the Swedish “utlänning” 
which does not have connotations to the extra-terrestrial or inhuman. Therefore I 
prefer not to perpetuate the dehumanising use of “alien”. 
I expected to find both explicit and implicit intertextual links between the 
Swedish texts and the European ones, and to be able to trace an evolution of how 
internal controls are made necessary through the historical Swedish material. A 
first analysis showed that much of the texts are concealing changes in practice, 
rather than presenting a clear change or development. This meant that I needed to 
pay closer attention to the issue of silences and concealment. What is silenced in a 
discourse can be equally important as what is explicitly articulated, in that it 
constitutes a hegemonic normality by excluding other perspectives and then 
concealing even the fact of that exclusion. Studying these silences requires careful 
reading and deconstruction, asking obvious questions about common-sense 
understandings and everyday banalities. It is methodologically tricky because it 
involves reading “between the lines”, and it can be harder to document the lack of 
something than its presence (Kronsell 2006). That does not mean that it is not a 
project worth undertaking.  
I started the analysis with the key policy documents on REVA and 
contemporary regulations for Swedish internal control of foreigners. From these 
texts I followed intertextual references to earlier texts, reading key texts in reverse 
chronological order back until the mid-1990s. This allowed me to identify the key 
texts that function as intertextual nodes (eg. the Swedish Government’s 
proposition 1997/98:42 on the Schengen Cooperation) and how later texts made 
use of them. This way of reading may run the risk of leading to a teleological 
analysis where the actual outcome seems to have been given all along, if it leads 
to only reading the texts that came to be influential over a longer period of time 
and missing those that represent alternative options/discourses. In order to prevent 
this, I conducted general searches for policy documents that in some way deal 
with internal control of foreigners. The reading in reverse chronological order 
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showed how the texts reference and make use of earlier texts to build their 
position, and how certain themes are reinforced over time. In order to focus more 
on how texts not only reference but also mediate and reinterpret earlier texts, I 
then did a second reading in chronological order. This second reading brought 
into focus how some themes – in particular the securitisation of migration – went 
from being more explicit to more implicit over time. The first reading identified 
primarily explicit intertextuality in references and quotes from earlier texts, while 
the second reading allowed me to catch more of the implicit intertextuality 
through catchphrases and shared concepts. Finally, following the traces of 
silenced exclusions I did a genealogical reading of Swedish migration law in a 
longer historical perspective. 
 
The analysis paid particular attention to the following questions:  
 
• How are the controls articulated: as border control, internal or foreign 
policy, security, governmentality, etc?  
• Are they articulated as European or specifically Swedish? Does this 
change over time? 
• Are changes in practice made explicit or concealed? How? 
• Eurocentrism 
• Silences 
• What is considered common-sense and obvious 
2.5  Limitations  
This is a limited case study, with a relatively small selection of texts. This type of 
discourse analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the case and texts in 
question, and a larger study would be too time-consuming. Instead, I use my 
limited study in order to discuss larger issues in the theoretical debates, also 
making use of existing studies of similar controls elsewhere in Europe.  
A specific limitation of the research model and method of text selection 
chosen is that it can only detect oppositional discourses when they are directly 
responded to in official discourse. This means that it is unable to assess how 
widely accepted and stable official discourse is in the wider public sphere. Models 
incorporating media, cultural representations and marginal politics would be more 
suited for studying this stability, conceived as hegemony (Hansen 2006:76). On 
the other hand, the incorporation of both Swedish and EU materials allows this 
study to detect stability and oppositions between those two levels. The study 
centres on the time period of the REVA project, but studies the project only as far 
as it relates to the phenomenon of internal control of foreigners. The details of 
what the project has entailed for the authorities involved is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. Similarly, while I do study legal text this is not a legal study as such, 
and I do not go into legal practice or precedent judgments based on these laws. 
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The obvious limitation of this choice of research questions, methodology and 
strategy is that it will not capture the practice and lived experiences of internal 
control, and how it is contested and negotiated on the ground. A very interesting 
perspective would be to use Butler’s notion of performativity; a process of 
constitution through a “stylized repetition of acts”, and an embodied social 
practice that reproduces, changes and challenges power relations (eg. Butler 
1999:179, 2000:270). Since identities – performed and perceived – are central to 
who gets controlled and who does not, this perspective would capture this as a site 
of political contestation. Sadly, the type of fieldwork this would need to be done 
properly is much beyond the scope of this study.  
Internal control is of course enmeshed in a larger set of policies on and politics 
of border control, asylum systems, and global migration. This thesis attempts to 
acknowledge these interconnections, but it is impossible to consider all angles in a 
limited space. Neither does the thesis go into debates on citizenship itself, though 
how internal control uses and redefines national and European citizenship would 
in itself be an interesting case for further study.  
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3 Making security move 
To understand internal control, it must be situated within policies of free 
movement and in processes of governmentality and securitisation. As discussed in 
the introduction, securitisation as understood by the Copenhagen School consists 
in framing a certain issue as an existential threat: framing it as being above 
politics or as a special kind of politics, authorising the use of force, and assigning 
responsibility to certain actors to deal with the threat. In a more Foucauldian 
tradition, securitisation can be seen as not only as speech acts but rather as a series 
of micro-level practices and techniques of government that involve discourses as 
well as institutional codifications, cooperation and interlinking of various policy 
agendas and technical systems. In other words, securitisation involves a 
technological governance of insecurity and a symbolic politics of fear (Huysmans 
2006), as well as a banal securitisation of scenes in everyday life (Amoore 2006). 
Much of the recent discussion of securitisation of migration and of the foreigner – 
especially of the Muslim Other – relates to the post-9/11 war on terror context, 
centred on but not limited to the US, where it is especially clear how an 
atmosphere of fear and security discourse connects with a violent racism. When 
terror alerts go out they “authorize and heighten racial hysteria in which fear is 
directed everywhere and nowhere […]. The result is that an amorphous racism 
abounds, rationalized by the claim of “self-defense” (Butler 2004:39). All of 
Europe has been implicated in this development, as has Sweden, both through the 
spread of discourses on the “terrorist danger”, and the direct cooperation with the 
US through e.g. the involvement in the war in Afghanistan. Another key event in 
the Swedish case is the controversial extradition of two men from Sweden to 
Egypt in December 2001. In Egypt, the men were imprisoned and tortured in 
contravention of diplomatic promises to the Swedish government. The extradition 
was supposedly carried out by masked American agents. The event is generally 
represented as illegal, in conflict with the rule of law and as unthinkable without 
the frame of the war on terror. (e.g. Flyghed 2005:393, Sundström 2013)  
Despite this, one should still be careful not to accept too easily the idea of the 
“war on terror” as an entirely game-changing impetus, as migration and security 
have been interlinked in various ways in Europe long before. Despite the member 
states’ retained competence to make decisions on national foreign and defence 
politics, security politics are and have been central to the European Union. With 
the creation of for example the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” and the 
“Common Foreign and Security Policy”, security has been inserted into the EU in 
various ways in bordering and neighbouring policies, internal governance policies 
and external policies that attempt to promote “good governance” (Manners 2013).  
There is a general agreement in the literature that migration started to become 
securitised in the late 1980s or early 1990s, when the focus of both the security 
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sector and security studies shifted with the post-Cold war agenda towards a 
broadening and deepening of security, both in terms of types of threats (not only 
military) and the referent (not only the state). In the Swedish case, there was a 
clear and increasing tendency to securitise migration and refugees throughout the 
1990s, that Elisabeth Abiri argues is connected to the uncertainty and weakening 
of the welfare state brought on by globalisation and used to prop up more 
restrictive immigration policies (Abiri 2000). This does not mean that the 
securitisation of migration always predates more restrictive immigration policies. 
Sweden had a need for labour immigration and encouraged it especially in the 
1960s, before the swing towards protecting the national labour market during the 
economic downturn in the 1970s and a greater focus of asylum policies. Hydén 
and Lundberg identify a shift from a more liberal immigration policy to a growing 
system of control between 1972 and 1989, and a very strict control with a parallel 
increased degree of illegal stay and labour from 1989 onwards (Hydén – 
Lundberg 2004:78). This illustrates that securitising discourse has not historically 
been a necessary precondition for restrictions of migration, as it in Sweden in the 
1970s and 1980s was deeply connected to labour market protection and not 
generally read as a security measure at that time. Again, treating migration as a 
security issue is not historically given but contingent. 
Within the European Union, both migration and asylum have been securitised 
through what Jef Huysmans terms “domains of insecurity”: a concept developed 
specifically to capture the multidimensional processes in the EU that securitise 
policy issues not through declaring them exceptional events, but through 
institutional linkages, shared practices and technical systems (Huysmans 
2006:149). An exceptionally clear case of this is the way the Schengen 
Convention links policy issues through grouping them together as if there is a 
natural connection, without explicitly declaring why or how they are connected. 
In this way, it naturalises a connection between organised crime, narcotics trade, 
human trafficking and illegal immigration. The “global war on terror” connected 
the terrorist threat to this existing security framework and both reinforced and 
fine-tuned its activities, for instance making it possible to conflate migrants from 
majority Muslim countries with Islamic terrorists (Cetti 2012:17).  
It is notable that the securitisation of migration in Europe has gone hand in 
hand with a rising consensus on the need for more restrictive measures against 
migration from non-EU countries and a process of Europeanization of migration 
policy. This is part of the development towards what has been called “Fortress 
Europe” as shorthand for how barriers towards the outside are strengthened while 
internal mobility is promoted (Talani 2012). Two things are important here: the 
first is that the idea of the fortress contains strongly defended walls against the 
outside, but it does not mean that there is no movement within the fortress. The 
second is that the way the inhabitants of the fortress move within it is not 
anarchic: it is structured by the physical layout of the fortress, where stairs and 
doorways are placed, and by guards who keep watch for intruders or suspicious 
behaviour. And for the guards to be able to keep watch, the people must be in 
movement. Within the “Fortress Europe”, there is an imperative of circulation that 
has been implemented as “freedom” (Bigo 2011b:3). For Huysmans, one of the 
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key ways the EU has been implicated in the securitisation of migration and 
asylum as well as a central element of its governmental identity is through the 
“Europeanization of internal security” (Huysmans 2006:152). This brings us back 
to the key notion that freedom of movement and security are not in opposition, but 
rather fundamentally linked: in the Foucauldian formulation, security is the result 
of liberties (Bigo 2011b:107). This means that for there to be security, there must 
be a freedom of circulation; and for there to be freedom, there must be security. 
Since security in this sense is made to happen largely through control and 
surveillance mechanisms, it is easier to understand why there is an imperative of 
circulation: if the people do not move, there is nothing for the surveillance to 
catch. This logic is made explicitly clear in the discourse on internal control of 
foreigners. Policy documents and official discourse on the control repeatedly 
reference the Schengen cooperation and convention, which functions as an 
intertextual node. In RPSFS 2011:4, the controls are explicitly articulated as one 
of the compensatory measures required by the abolishment of border controls at 
the internal borders in the Schengen area. The guidelines also say: “In order to 
maintain the free movement of persons within the Schengen Area it is important 
that control of foreigners is carried out across the whole country” (RPSFS 2011:4 
4§). In other words, freedom of movement needs to be actively upheld by control 
across all of the territory. This, then, is the current reasoning for why the control is 
necessary.  
The Schengen convention requires its member states to put compensatory 
measures in place, and they exist in several versions across the member states. As 
one example, in Austria compensatory measures were implemented by the Vienna 
Police from 2007 onwards, to offset the supposed “security deficit” brought by the 
Schengen enlargement and opening of the borders towards neighbouring countries 
in Eastern Europe. They include surveillance of transit routes and of international 
train traffic and stations and stop and search activities. In the Austrian context, the 
compensatory measures can be understood as an undercover control that the 
Schengen enlargement offered a great opportunity to install: “A functional need 
was conjured to introduce a measure which otherwise would have been debatable 
and even questionable” (Schwell in press:18). Alexandra Schwell traces the 
impetus for the compensatory measures to a need to set the population at ease 
from the imagined threat of the Other, fuelled by for instance the tabloid press’ 
depictions of the flood of criminal Eastern gangs that the Austrian population was 
supposedly terrified were about to invade their country after the enlargement. 
Schwell also connects the specific ways this Othering takes place to Austria’s role 
as a former colonial power in the Habsburg Empire that now feels under siege 
from its former crown lands. (Schwell in press) This illustrates how the internal 
controls are both part of a wider Europeanizing process and shaped by specific 
local histories and conditions, and how the Other to be controlled can be another 
European. 
In Sweden the internal control did not come into being as an Schengen 
compensatory measure. There has been some version of control of foreigners in 
place since the early 20th century, and the legal framework for the internal control 
of foreigners has been strikingly similar for the past quarter century. The previous 
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version of the regulations on internal control were from 1989 – that is seven years 
before Sweden joined the Schengen Cooperation in 1996 and twelve years before 
the country became an operational member in 2001. The 1989 regulations did not 
change when the new Aliens Act was implemented in 2006, but only five years 
later. The 2011 guidelines are more explicit in their discussion of why and how 
controls should be carried out, but the goal of the control remains the same as it 
was stated in 1986: to search for persons who are to be refused entry or expulsed, 
and to monitor that no foreigners reside or work in Sweden without proper 
permits (RPSFS 1986:3). In other words, RPSFS 2011:4 rearticulates an existing 
national practice of control as a part of a European/Schengen framework and as a 
necessary companion to maintaining free movement of persons. This discursive 
logic was evident and made explicit when the Swedish membership of the 
Schengen Area was discussed: it is articulated in the Schengen Convention itself 
and referenced explicitly and implicitly in for instance the Swedish Government’s 
proposition on the Schengen Cooperation (Prop. 1997/1998:42) and on Police 
cooperation because of the Swedish accession to Schengen (Prop. 1999/2000:64).  
The proposition on the Schengen cooperation, which is an intertextual node in 
the discourse, articulates two closely linked fundamental ideas for the 
cooperation. The first is the free movement of people, in the sense that controls at 
the national borders internal to the area shall cease. The second, described as 
partly actualized by the first, is that “the fight shall be strengthened against 
international criminality and such immigration that is illegal” (Prop. 
1997/1998:42, p. 12). Here, immigration is discursively linked with illegality and 
international criminality: an obvious securitising move in line with Huysman’s 
“domains of insecurity”. The compensatory measures of the Schengen 
cooperation are articulated as aimed to prevent that the free movement of people 
as an unwanted side effect aids international crime. The linking of migration and 
crime in the Schengen cooperation is not only about conceptual linkages at the 
linguistic level. It also involves institutional arrangements and transfer of 
techniques from the struggle against drugs, terrorism and transnational crime to 
the struggle to control the frontiers and the movement of people in what Didier 
Bigo terms a “continuum of (in)security” (Bigo 2011b:108).  
One example of this is the creation of Europol, the common European police 
agency, that according to Prop. 1997/1998:42 shall fight organised international 
crime of a serious nature, mainly the narcotics trade but also other grave 
criminality. The list of examples of particularly serious crimes includes money 
laundering, human trafficking, terrorism and “crime that is associated with illegal 
immigration networks” (Prop. 1997/1998:42, p. 9). The phenomenon of 
immigration in general is associated with criminality and shady networks, and 
illegal immigration is securitised as a threat of the same order as terrorism, 
narcotics trade and human trafficking. There is also a securitisation of the 
individual traveller and potential migrant who is a third country national: that is, 
from outside of the Schengen Area and European Union. This happens partly 
through the use of the Schengen Information System, which is a register over 
persons who are to be denied entry to the Schengen Area. The purpose of the 
system is to “maintain public order and security, including State security” and to 
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apply the provisions of the Schengen convention relating to the movement of 
persons (The Schengen Convention, Article 93). According to the Prop. 
1997/1998:42, control of travellers at the Schengen external borders shall pay 
special attention to threats to public order and security when controlling travel 
documents and establishing identities. Foreigners are to be more carefully 
controlled than EU citizens, and a search should in principle always be made in 
SIS (Prop. 1997/1998:42, p. 13, 82). Worth noting here is that while “third 
country” refers to all other states except the Schengen member states, “foreigner” 
refers to citizens in states that are not members of the EU (Prop. 1997/1998:42, p. 
47). For the Schengen Convention, the foreigner is a non-European, and it is the 
foreigner that is most important to control as a potential security threat. This 
happens through extensive use of socio-technical surveillance systems, 
institutional cooperation and huge databases, such as the Eurodac database, the 
Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System. The SIS II 
became operational in April 2013 and now also includes the use of biometric 
information (European Commission Home Affairs 2014). With the signing of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1999, the Schengen Acquis was incorporated into the 
framework of the European Union itself, as a move towards establishing an “area 
of freedom, security and justice” (Amsterdam Treaty 97/C 340/01). The 
institutionalised securitisation of migration control is also very evident in the 
constitution and operations of Frontex, the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, established in 2004.  
Taken together, this constitutes a system of surveillance that can be read as a 
Panopticon in the Foucaudian sense where every single individual feels under 
constant possibility of surveillance (Foucault 1979). Registering the traces of 
irregular immigrants, the “Panopticon Europe” functions as a  “factory of 
exclusion” aiming to facilitate expulsion (Broeders 2007). Though given the 
differential nature of this surveillance, it is perhaps better understood rather as a 
Ban-opticon, where through a process of abnormalisation of the margins only 
certain individuals and groups are banned into surveillance and made insecure in 
order to create security for the majority (Bigo 2005, 2011).  
In summary, the securitisation of migration and of the figure of the non-
European foreigner is thorough in the late 1990:s official documents on the 
Swedish Schengen membership, and institutionalised through the socio-technical 
surveillance systems of the cooperation. When later texts such as RPSFS 2011:4 
reference the Schengen cooperation, they are also implicitly referencing migration 
and the foreigner as securitised. The securitising groundwork is already laid, and 
while it may be continually reinforced through references and discursive and 
institutional reiterations, these generally become less explicit as the connections 
become naturalised and sedimented as objective. Overall, the securitisation is 
more evident in the 1990:s and much more implicit in the contemporary material, 
evoked through references to Schengen and in the institutional setup of the 
European migration regime. In most of the material, internal control of foreigners 
is articulated as policing: to be carried out by police officers across all of the 
territory, integrated with everyday operations. In the Schengen-related materials 
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the internal control is explicitly articulated as policing to differentiate it from the 
controls at the internal borders that the convention prohibits. That internal control 
is conceived as policing and integrated in all work also means that the 
securitisation of the foreigner is not limited to the moment of border crossing at 
the outer edge of the territory. Instead it becomes integrated with potentially all 
interactions with a police officer in a securitisation of scenes of everyday life. 
3.1 Desecuritisation and counter-discourses 
If an issue can be securitised – moved from the realm of ordinary politics and into 
the realm of security and exceptional measures – it seems reasonable that it could 
also be moved from security and back into politics. This is the process of 
desecuritisation. The concept of desecuritisation has been less studied and 
conceptualised than securitisation itself. With the Copenhagen School’s focus on 
securitisation as elite speech acts, desecuritisation can be understood as happening 
primarily at the level of official discourse and policy: “the shifting of issues out of 
emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere” 
(Buzan et al 1998:4). While arguing for the normative relevance of the 
Copenhagen School’s commitment to desecuritisation, Hansen identifies four 
methods of desecuritisation: change through stabilisation, replacement, 
rearticulation and silencing, all of which relates to the disappearance of an issue 
from the security policy agenda either through gradual change or active solutions 
(Hansen 2012).  
As discussed in the previous section, the securitisation of migration and the 
foreigner connected to internal control of foreigners in Sweden has become less 
explicit at the level of speech acts in the last ten years. This does not in itself 
constitute a desecuritisation, since the securitised framework is continually 
reinforced both through its institutional set-up as well as explicit and implicit 
references to earlier securitising texts without questioning the securitising logic. 
While “silencing” is one of the potential methods of desecuritisation Hansen 
identifies, it is also the one she finds is trickiest to handle within the Copenhagen 
School framework, as silencing would mean there is a lack of speech acts to 
analyse. The example of desecuritising silence Hansen uses relates to the 
exclusion of female ex-combatants from social re-integration programs, where 
their experiences are disappeared and de-politicised. Silencing-as-desecuritisation 
is then in itself normatively problematic, since it may work as a strategy of 
exclusion of those previously securitised, rather than offering political 
possibilities for resistance and re-negotiation. The Copenhagen School does also 
acknowledge that securitisations may be institutionalised to the extent that there 
no longer are any explicit securitising speech acts. (Hansen 2013:545) The latter 
is closer to what has been occurring regarding internal control of foreigners.  
For Claudia Aradau when discussing desecuritisation, the very logic of 
security and securitisation must be resisted through a commitment to 
emancipation through a “democratic politics of universal norms and slow 
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procedures” over “the exceptional politics of speed and enemy exclusion” 
(Aradau 2004). Critical approaches that see securitisation as happening at the 
level of everyday social interactions spread out over society tend to see the need 
for desecuritisation to also emerge from the margins, for securitised groups to 
question the established order (eg. Kinnvall – Nesbitt-Larking 2013:349, Amoore 
2006).  
While counter-discourses do appear in the material on internal control of 
foreigners, they should not simply be read as instances of desecuritisation. These 
counter-discourses appear through references to NGO reports or critical 
interventions in parliamentary debate, and rearticulate the control as 
discriminatory and racial or ethnic profiling. These interventions strive to make 
visible the control, as a discriminatory and securitarian practice. When opposing 
the Swedish entry to the Schengen cooperation, the umbrella organisation for 
Swedish asylum groups and the Swedish Refugee Council drew attention to the 
negative consequences for asylum seekers and the lack of transparency, rule of 
law and data privacy in the extensive police cooperation and surveillance 
mechanisms that the cooperation entails, and how in particular persons with a 
non-European appearance are likely to be stopped, controlled and entered into 
these systems (FARR 1997). This statement was part of an official review process 
of the proposal to join the Schengen cooperation, and the final government 
proposition references the report but only addresses the concern it voices 
regarding carrier liability. The critique of Schengen as an undemocratic, 
securitarian surveillance system is not in any way engaged (Prop. 1997/98:42, p. 
45). 
Even if one understands the process of attempting to make the control visible 
and political as an attempt at desecuritisation, it has not been successful in moving 
the official discourse or policy. One can also question the extent to which these 
counter-discourses come from the very margin, if they manage to let the most 
securitised speak for themselves. In another example of the counter-discourses 
under discussion here, those securitised and controlled only get to speak their 
experiences to power through several removes: in interviews to a journalist 
looking into the REVA project, whose report is surely edited by several people 
before being published, and then read by a politician in the opposition who finally 
references it when debating the current Minister of Justice (Leander 2014, Prot. 
2013/14:89 13 § anf. 66). Further, those interviewed in this report are individuals 
who have experienced the controls as discriminatory and who have been 
controlled despite having legal permission to be in the country. Those who are the 
actual target of the control – the undocumented migrants, the asylum seekers 
whose applications have been turned down and who have gone into hiding – do 
not get to speak for themselves. Doing so publically would mean to risk 
discovery, detainment and deportation, and the possibility to do so effectively 
would also require having access to channels of communication, influential 
contacts, knowing the language and how to frame ones story strategically, and so 
on. In other words, speaking effectively requires resources, many of which the 
most marginalised are unlikely to have access to. It is therefore possible, to use 
the terms of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, to read them as subaltern. As she 
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cautions apropos of her famous essay Can the subaltern speak, one should be 
careful to not too quickly identify the decipherment or interpretation by for 
example an academic in a remote institution with the “speaking” of the subaltern 
herself. For Spivak, the subaltern is on the other side of an epistemic fracture, 
lacking lines of communication to the institutionalised society (Spivak 1999:309). 
If lines of communication are established the person is no longer a subaltern, 
which is of course what is normatively desirable. The question of how to establish 
those lines of communication remains a major challenge. 
3.2 Effectivity and governmentality 
In parallel and intertwined with the securitising discourse, there is a discourse of 
effectivity running through all of the material. Controls must be intensified and 
made more effective. The task from the Government in 2009 that initiated the 
REVA project was for the Migration Board, the Police and the Prison and 
Probation Service to intensify cooperation to render the operations of the 
authorities more effective, and to increase the number and speed of enforcements 
carried out. Every year in the period 2009-2014, these authorities have been 
tasked with continually increasing the efficiency, speed and number of 
enforcements compared to the previous year.1 As previously noted, 
“enforcement”2 is generally used throughout the material as shorthand for 
enforcement of a decision on refusal of entry or expulsion, such as when an 
individual does not voluntarily leave the country after a refusal of an application 
for asylum. Enforcement becomes synonymous with expulsion and used instead 
of it, which in Swedish makes it sounds less like a violent and political act, and 
more like an everyday bureaucratic procedure. In some cases, it gets used as a 
verb applied directly to the person, not the decision. In a newspaper interview in 
March 2013, border police chief officer Petra Stenkula in Malmö consistently 
never refers to expulsions as the goal for internal control: it always about refusal 
of entry, and those detained are “transferred” to another country, or in a notable 
turn of phrase they “are enforced” (Orrenius 2013-03-17). The person and the 
decision become synonymous, indivisible. The person is their legal status, their 
main characteristic what procedure they are involved in. 
The demand for greater efficiency in enforcement processes also brings a 
demand for greater efficiency in internal controls of foreigners. A National Police 
Board oversight report on enforcement work from 2013 discusses the demand for 
increased efficiency, and finds that there is no evident answer for how to improve 
efficiency, as it must be tempered by respect for the rule of law and non-
discrimination. In the report, this is discussed in terms of the importance of a 
“correct conduct” by e.g. avoiding inappropriate word choices in order to “create 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Regleringsbrev för Migrationsverket, Rikspolisstyrelsen och Kriminalvården 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 
2 ”verkställighet” 
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professional client relations” (Rikspolisstyrelsen 2013:10, p. 20, 36). Here, those 
who are to be deported are “clients” and it is important that police officers realise 
that the clients may find the procedure of being deported frustrating. Among the 
measures important for improved efficiency the report does identify, one is “better 
capability to find absconders” – to quickly identify “those who keep away from 
enforcements”, in other words, those who go into hiding from the authorities to 
avoid deportation (Rikspolisstyrelsen 2013:10, p. 38). According to the report, 
this demands that the police resources for internal control of foreigners are 
concentrated and used effectively. One of the final recommendations of the report 
is that the Police authorities shall develop their capabilities to find absconded 
foreigners, and set a higher goal for the number of cases “where the foreigner is 
available for enforcement of the decision on refusal of entry or expulsion” 
(Rikspolisstyrelsen 2013:10, p. 44). In practice, this would mean more developed 
and more intensively used methods for internal control of foreigners, as that is the 
measure intended to search for foreigners who are to leave the country.  
Efficiency in expulsions is sometimes also set up as a precondition for a 
humane asylum policy – for such a policy to be sustainable in the long term, those 
who are rejected must leave the country, said Minister for Justice Beatrice Ask 
(Prot. 2013/14:89). Articulating efficiency as connected to a humane asylum 
policy is also a way of articulating it as specifically Swedish. There is a clear 
desire to see Swedish refugee and asylum politics as especially generous and 
humane, something that may be considered constitutive of the Swedish self-image 
as an international model and leading country (Johansson 2008).3 Much as 
internal control itself, the demand for increased speed and efficiency in enforcing 
expulsions is neither new nor uniquely Swedish. A 1997 government-
commissioned report on enforcement and control in cases involving foreigners 
underlines the importance of the Swedish membership of the EU for these issues. 
It references the European Council’s wish for improved efficiency in enforcement 
work through cooperation. The Council made a number of recommendations 
along these lines to the member states between 1992 and 1997. The demand for 
efficiency is also connected to the Dublin Convention that was first signed by the 
12 EU states in 1990 and entered into force in 1997, and which implies that 
applications for asylum should only be tried once in the EU, in the first country 
the asylum seeker enters (SOU 1997:128, p. 39-40). 
The demand for constantly increased effectivity can be understood as a 
legitimising strategy of the state under governmentalization, in line with Butler’s 
argument (2004:95). The REVA project in particular is easy to read through the 
lens of governmentality, with its focus on increasing collaboration between 
agencies and streamlining administrative procedures. Particularly clear examples 
of the governmentalization of internal control include the responsibility for hotel 
managers to keep registers over foreign guests, and the “carrier liability” that 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 The extent to which asylum politics are articulated as specifically Swedish or commonly European may in this 
sense have much to tell us about how Swedish self-image is negotiated as part of or differentiated from a 
European identity, though that is a topic for a different study. 
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makes e.g. airlines responsible for controlling that foreigners from non-Schengen 
countries have proper permits and economical means for their return journey (SFS 
2005:716 3§ 9 chap, 5§ 12 chap.). Carrier companies who fail to carry out 
controls properly may be fined or made responsible for returning the foreigner to 
their point of origin. This means that carrier companies take an economic risk 
when transporting individuals who might be turned away at the Schengen border, 
and in a mode of governmentality both authorises and demands that the 
companies take on a pre-sorting function, deciding who is allowed to embark on a 
journey towards crossing the Schengen border. The discussion of the way the 
border is de-territorialised in this kind of practice continues in chapter 5. The 
following chapter looks further into how the sorting functions in internal control: 
who is the target of the control, and who is to be sorted out. In theoretical terms, 
this means looking into the biopolitics of the security dispositif to talk 
Foucauldian, and to consider how the control is enmeshed in Eurocentrism and 
interacts with processes of racialization. 
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4 Who is to be controlled?  
In the European Union, the imperative of circulation is implemented as 
“freedom”: the freedom to move is also an obligation to circulate, to be 
controllable (Bigo 2005:3). As such, the current Western regime of mobility can 
be understood as a system of accelerated mobility, which is not freedom of 
movement for all but rather privileges speed, comfort and security for “legitimate” 
mobility only. This is made to happen under intensive surveillance and use of 
technologies of control such as biometrics and e-visas (Bigo 2011a). The system 
needs sorting mechanisms to separate the desirable mobility from the undesirable. 
A way of making the effects of this regime visible would be to trace its interaction 
with two paradigmatic figures: “the neoliberal citizen” on one hand, and “the 
asylum seeker” on the other (Ajana 2013:2). One whose mobility is considered 
productive, to be encourage and protected, contra one who is to be controlled and 
whose legitimacy is constantly put under suspicion. This chapter will analyse the 
biopolitics of the control through its interactions with the “outsider within” it 
strives to control, in particular the Roma, thus tracing how “the foreigner” and 
“the citizen” are constituted.   
In the Aliens Act, there is no explicit definition of foreigner, “utlänning”.  
RPSFS 2011:4 §1 says: “Foreigner refers to one who is not a Swedish citizen.” 
This means that anyone who is not a citizen may be controlled, but that Swedish 
citizens should never be targeted by the control. The aim of the control is to 
identify and detain those who do not have the legal right to be in the country, but 
this formulation of who is to be controlled means that also those non-citizens who 
do have legal permission to be in the country may be controlled. The legality of 
their stay is to be continuously under watch, so that they do not overstay their 
welcome or transgress the conditions of their permit. As long as they are not 
citizens, legal residents are subsumed in the category of “foreigner”. In the 
regulations, the non-citizen with a permanent residence permit, for instance, is not 
at all visible. There are only citizens and foreigners. This is a clear example of the 
kind of binary division that postcolonial theory and deconstruction sees as deeply 
Eurocentric. The binary citizen-foreigner sets up the foreigner as subject to 
control and the citizen as exempt from it, as well as posits that these two 
categories are easily separable, opposite to one another and mutually exclusive: 
someone cannot be both citizen and foreigner. The way the discourse on the 
control uses the binary also presumes that the being-citizen or being-foreigner is 
an intrinsic characteristic of a person, which is also possible to see and categorise. 
If not by the naked eye of an ordinary citizen, then at least through the expertise 
and analytic profiling of the experienced police officer or border guard and their 
employment of tacit professional experience (Hyden – Lundberg 2004:177-179, 
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Schwell, in press). As their support, they have the technically advanced 
surveillance and registration systems of the European cooperation.  
The Swedish official discourse on the control does recognize that there is a 
risk of discrimination in controlling foreigners, and attempts to check this by 
limiting when and how the controls should be carried out. According to the law, 
control may “only be undertaken if there is well-grounded reason to assume that 
the foreigner lacks the right to remain in this country or there is otherwise special 
cause for controls” (Aliens Act 2005:751, §9 chap. 9). This differentiates the 
Swedish set-up of the control mechanism from many other Schengen countries, 
such as Germany, Belgium, France and Spain where it is obligatory for foreigners 
to carry identity documents at all times, and thus no particular reason is needed 
for checks of these documents to be carried out in public spaces (Doomernik – 
Jandl 2008:205). Under the Swedish legal system, there is not an obligation to 
carry identity documents. According to the National Police Board guidelines, 
neither should the obligation for a foreigner to show their passport or other 
documents when requested to do so by a police officer or the Migration Board be 
understood as an obligation to carry these documents at all times (RPSFS 2011:4). 
However, in practice the burden of proof still falls to the individual, who is 
obliged to show proof of their legal status or that they are in fact citizens and 
should not be controlled. This may include being required to come to the police 
station or the Migration Board’s offices.   
What is “a well-grounded reason to assume” that the foreigner lacks the right 
to be in the country is specified somewhat in RPSFS 2011:4 §5. According to the 
guidelines, this prerequisite should be understood to mean that a control may only 
be carried out after a comprehensive assessment of the objective circumstances of 
the present case. These “objective circumstances” can include the individual 
police officer’s observations, tips, intelligence reports or profiles based on such 
intelligence. Controls may also be carried out when there is reason to control the 
identity of a foreigner in connection to for instance a criminal investigation or a 
vehicle control. Further, “the foreigner’s behaviour and company can be a 
circumstance that in some cases gives well-grounded reason for control.” Internal 
control of foreigners may not be carried out solely on the basis of if a person’s 
appearance is perceived as foreign, or because of his or her name or language. 
This final clause is what is supposed to keep the controls from being 
discriminatory. It is worth drawing attention to the little word solely in that 
phrase, because that conveys the important distinction that the police are not 
forbidden from making judgements partly based on a person’s appearance or 
language – they are simply required to have some additional basis for control, 
such as behaviour or intelligence-based profiles. The lack of clarity in the 
regulations has been repeatedly criticized over the years, both by counter-
discourses that consider them discriminatory (e.g. Leander 2014), and from within 
for making police work inefficient because “police officers are worried about 
being perceived as discriminating or ‘racist’.” (SOU 2004:110 p.254). The latter 
argument then considers discrimination and racism as a problem of perception 
only, one that hinders real work; a problem for the police and not for those 
discriminated. It distances the problem of racism further by placing “racist” in 
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scare quotes as the most terrible of accusations. That the basic premises of the 
regulations have not changed since 1989 despite continuously reoccurring critique 
can be read as a strategically upheld vagueness, in that it allows for incorporating 
the control in an official discourse of equality before the law and humane 
migration politics, while simultaneously opening for discriminatory practices.  
An example of how the regulations are interpreted in practice can be found in 
an article in the internal Police magazine Sambandet, which describes an internal 
Police education on internal control of foreigners. Following training on the 
current Aliens Act and how to identify forged documents, a group of police 
officers were sent out to apply what they had learnt. One group was sent to the 
area Hallonbergen: “the Stockholm Police have been tipped off that there are 
many Mongolians living there, and the plan is to control among those heading to 
work in the morning.” (Sambandet 2012:25). Police intelligence and tip-offs that 
are considered reason for control may in other words be something as simple as 
“there are many people of a certain ethnicity in this area”. This slippage between 
“foreigner” and “foreigner without legal permits” occurs in many places in the 
texts. Being “a foreigner” means being potentially being controlled, and the 
presence of “foreigners” in an area means that controls must be carried out there. 
A 1997 directive for a government-commissioned report discusses the need for 
increased efforts in internal control of foreigners following the Schengen 
Agreement in terms that take it for granted that the removal of controls at the 
Schengen Area’s internal borders must be compensated. It also considers that “the 
situation that foreigners reside in the country without residence permits for longer 
periods of time amounts to an large scale social problem in many countries. These 
problems have so far been small in Sweden and other Nordic countries, partly 
because the possibility to avoid discovery has been comparatively small.” (Dir. 
1997:6, p. 5). In other words, the mere presence of foreigners without permits is in 
itself the problem. The text does not clarify in any way why or how it becomes a 
social problem; it is presented as a fact and articulated as objective. Neither are 
the reasons why the risk of discovery in the Nordic countries has been high 
detailed. Why is the foreigner a social problem, and who is the foreigner whose 
very presence is problematic? This leads us onwards to the next level of defining 
who the problematic foreigner is: the visibly Other. A genealogical reading of 
Swedish migration law is instructive in this regard.  
4.1 The dangerous asocial vagrant  
In the late 1800s, migration in Sweden largely meant emigration and there were 
no formal restrictions of immigration, which can be framed as that the Swedish 
state was “upholding the principle of free exchange of people between countries” 
until the start of World War I (SOU 2004:74, p. 49). After this period, the first 
Swedish law regulating control of foreigners, the law concerning prohibitions for 
foreigners to reside in the country, came into force in 1914. Its goal was not to 
control all immigration, but specifically to make it possible to refuse entry to or 
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deport “criminal or asocial foreigners” (SOU 2004:74, p. 49). The specific 
foreigners who were to be kept out of the country were “gypsies,4 and any other 
foreigner who clearly intends to make their living through begging or itinerant 
playing of music, showing of animals, or similar” (SFS 1914:196). The 2004 
government report that preceded the current Aliens Act starts its historical 
overview with this law, but makes no mention of the specific group it was meant 
to exclude from the country. This is entirely in line with the way the deep 
historical structural discrimination and persecution of Roma and Travellers in 
Sweden has been largely silenced in public discourse or treated very much as a 
special interest-issue. The 1914 law can also be connected to the preceding 1885 
law on vagrancy (SFS 1885:27) that allowed the arrest and registration of anyone 
who lacked means, employment and a permanent residence. The same applied to 
anyone who did not “earn an honest living” and whose way of living endangered 
“public security, order and common decency” (SFS 1885:27). In an 1886 addition, 
the vagrancy law also allowed for conveying foreigners found guilty of vagrancy 
to the country in which they were subjects (SFS 1886:33).  
A second immigration law was implemented in 1927 with the dual purposes of 
protecting the Swedish labour market from foreign competition and to protect the 
Swedish race. It also upheld the specific exclusion of the Roma. In the proposition 
preceding the law, the government considered that “The value of the fact that the 
population of our country is of an exceptionally homogenous and pure race can 
hardly be overstated” (Ds. 2014:8, p. 147). In other words, the reasoning behind 
the need for immigration laws was an explicitly race-biological nationalism. The 
entry ban against the Roma was in force until 1954, and also had severe effects for 
Roma within the country. Since they were excluded from the census and 
municipal registration, Roma in Sweden were basically stateless and unable to 
prove their right to re-enter the country if they were to leave to for example visit 
family elsewhere in Europe. The ban on entry was upheld during the Second 
World War, and there are documented cases of Roma who were refused entry at 
the Swedish border who were later sent to Nazi concentration camps.  
In the 1954 Aliens Act, the formal entry ban against “gypsies” was removed 
since discrimination on racial grounds at this point was considered incompatible 
with the Swedish conception of justice. (Ds. 2014:8, p. 148-155) The possibility 
to refuse entry to those who could reasonably be suspected not to earn an honest 
living remained however, and from the debate preceding the law it is clear that the 
categories of “gypsy” and “unable to make an honest living” were thought to 
overlap significantly. In the proposition, the head of the department also stressed 
that only Swedish citizens have an unconditional right to reside and work in the 
country, and that there was a need for a permanent system of rules against 
“asocial foreigners” as well as a more general control of foreigners. The debate 
focused on how to ensure that “foreigners’ settling” benefits society, and found it 
a particularly keen need to “as far as possible prevent un-wanted, destitute 
foreigners from entering the country to here give themselves up to idling” (Prop. 
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1954:41, p. 81–93). This provides a very clear illustration of the biopolitical 
elements of Swedish migration control, as one of the ways the state aims to 
control and improve the population through protecting it from unwanted, 
degenerate or unproductive influences. It resonates with the medical discourse of 
biopower that needed to protect the population not only from the threatening 
outsiders, but also from the insiders that were “abnormal in behaviour, species or 
race” (Elden 2011:25) – the Roma who were already living in the country and 
who were to be excluded. The shift from the explicitly ethnic/racial exclusion of 
the Roma to their implicit exclusion as social undesirables brings into focus the 
notion that biopoliticising is also always racialising (Dillon 2011). The unwanted 
poor are both racialised and criminalised.  
The notion that foreigners should be a productive contribution to society to be 
allowed to settle has not disappeared from the discourse or the policy.  The 1st of 
May 2014, a measure from the EU Free Movement Directive (2004/38/EC, §16) 
was written into the Swedish Aliens Act, whereby an EU citizen may be refused 
entry or deported if they become an “unreasonable burden” on the social 
assistance system during the first three months of residence (SFS 2005:716 chap. 
8 §9). European citizens may also be expelled if they threaten public security or 
public order (SFS 2005:716 chap. 8 §11-14). The European Free Movement 
Directive also considers protection of public policy and public health valid 
reasons for expelling European citizens (2004/38/EC, §22). The new measures in 
the Swedish law can be understood as part of the on-going Europeanization of 
migration policy, and also as targeting the Roma in particular, though today 
mainly those from Central and Eastern Europe who are by many ways of 
reckoning the most marginalised European citizens today. The social exclusion of 
the Roma in both their home states and host states when they migrate within the 
EU creates insurmountable barriers to formal employment for many. In turn, this 
means they cannot prove “sufficient resources” to be allowed to settle in another 
EU state, which excludes them from registering their residency and thereby from 
accessing key social and political rights. (FRA 2009)  
The growing number of poor and homeless European migrants in Sweden is 
often debated as a social issue that ought to be solved by their home states, in 
particular that Romania should take better care of the Roma minority within its 
own borders. In the current discussions, one can see how some Swedish 
politicians locate the responsibility for the misery of the Roma migrants in the 
policy failures of their home states, while for instance a Romanian representative 
in Sweden, Damian Drăghicis, argues that the Romanian state does its best but 
cannot be blamed for the fact that Roma travel to Sweden to beg for money in the 
streets. He argues that the Roma like travelling “by nature” and since all 
Romanian citizens are now allowed to travel within the EU, the Romanian state 
cannot prevent them (Thurfjell 2014). In other words, the responsibility for the 
extreme marginalisation of the Roma is still assigned to their own “deviant 
nature” as essentially Other. Another recurring theme in the debate is whether the 
begging Roma are connected to criminal gangs and human trafficking, which has 
been repeatedly denied by those doing social work with these groups (see e.g. 
Israelson 2013, Poohl et al. 2014). Begging is not criminal under current Swedish 
  32 
law, though a prohibition was debated in parliament as recently as February 2014 
following motions on the subject by the neofascist party Swedish Democrats 
(SD)5 and individual politicians from the dominant government party 
Moderaterna. SD proposes criminalising “begging or activities that can be 
considered as such, vagrancy and similar” by foreign citizens, and that the 
foreigners caught in any such activity should be immediately deported and 
forbidden to return (2013/14:Ju379). The discourse is strikingly similar to the one 
used by the Swedish vagrancy and immigration laws at the last turn of the 
century, where the state in a biopolitical mode aims to protect its population from 
immoral and unproductive influences. Biopolitics is however not only about 
preventing and sorting out some life, but also about promoting the life that is 
considered productive. In order to examine the biopolitics of migration policy, it 
is then equally important to consider whose migration is considered attractive and 
to be promoted.  
4.2 The Ban-opticon revisited 
The very same year as the entry ban against the Roma was lifted, in 1954, 
Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland introduced a total exemption from the 
passport requirements within the Nordic countries for Nordic citizens and agreed 
to a common Nordic labour market. The passport controls at the intra-Nordic 
borders were abolished through an agreement in 1957, and Iceland joined the 
agreement in 1966. This means that other Nordic citizens have been able to reside 
and work in Sweden under the same conditions as Swedish citizens for the last 
sixty years. This agreement did not, however, apply to non-citizens with a 
permanent residence permit from any other of the Nordic states (SOU 2004:74, p. 
52, 89). The freedom of movement for Nordic citizens has not been accompanied 
by a perceived security deficit and demand for increased control, from which one 
can draw the conclusion that the Nordic foreigner has not been constituted as a 
problematic or dangerous figure that the nation needs to be protected against. It 
becomes clear that the presence of other Nordic citizens on Swedish territory – 
working, residing, holidaying – without any special restrictions, registration or 
control, does not in itself constitute a social problem. The legitimacy and legality 
of their presence is not in question. Freedom of movement within the Nordic 
countries does not need compensatory measures.  
Contrasted to the notion that the presence of unregistered foreigners in a 
country in itself constitutes a taken-for-granted extensive social problem, it 
appears as though Nordic citizens are not really foreigners at all. Especially since 
as discussed above, for foreigners without residence permits in the Nordic 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 SD prefers to present itself as ”critical to immigration”. I consider it politically dangerous to accept their self-
labelling and argue in line with Henrik Arnstad (2012-11-15) that the party is better understood as 
ultranationalist and (neo)fascist.  
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countries “the possibility to avoid discovery has been comparatively small.” (Dir. 
1997:6, p. 5). On the one hand, this speaks to e.g. the Swedish welfare state 
tradition, where social support systems have been closely tied to national 
registration and where lacking a personal identity number can make interacting 
with any kind of bureaucracy exceedingly difficult. As discussed above, exclusion 
of the Roma as essentially stateless happened in part through active exclusion 
from municipal registration and therefore from the right to vote, to schooling, to 
healthcare, and so forth (Ds. 2014:8). Simultaneously, they were also put under 
heavy punitive surveillance with violent police raids such as the “total gypsy 
inventory” in 1954, and previous “total inspections” in e.g. 1907, 1922, 1943, 
1954-55 and 1965-66. The 1954 inventory formed the basis for a “complete” 
register of “the gypsies and vagrants” in the country, where every individual was 
assigned a “z-number” – the same method of registration as used in Nazi 
Germany before the Holocaust. These registers were in still in use by some 
Swedish authorities into the 1970s, where they connected family trees with 
personal acts and information on e.g. sterilisations and children taken into 
custody. As late as 1981, the National Board of Health and Welfare established a 
catalogue of “Swedish gypsies”. (Jansson – Schmid 2005:67-73, Ds. 2014:8 p. 94) 
In September 2013, a register with the title “total” in the folder “kringresande” 
meaning “itinerant” or “travelling” was revealed to exist at the Police authority in 
Skåne. The register was a family tree of people with Roma origins, including 
many who had never been suspected of any crime, persons long deceased and 
children under the age of two. The register file had been created in 2012, but was 
most likely built on data collected during many years (Orrenius 2013-09-23). The 
history of the Swedish state’s interaction with the Roma shows how the “Ban-
opticon” can produce exclusion in two very different but related ways: there is 
both a ban into a punitive surveillance and a ban out from a more general social 
surveillance/registration connected to the very “right to have rights”.  Selective 
non-collection of data that hinders e.g. improving access to housing or medical 
care for the undocumented happens all across the EU and can be understood as 
part of deterrence strategy and a “screening out of unwanted humanity” (Hintjens 
2013).  
 The idea that “foreigners” have had a hard time going undiscovered in the 
Nordic states and that this is not complicated by free intra-Nordic movement also 
speaks clearly to how Swedish nationalism considers the Nordic peoples to be 
“sister nations”, united by sister languages, history, culture, and importantly by a 
specific Scandinavian whiteness. In nationalist discourse, the exclusion of 
foreigners can also be connected to the specific dynamics of the welfare state, 
where belonging to the nation both regulates and is determined by access to social 
benefits (Johansson 2005, Crowley 2005). While the institutional set-up of the EU 
migration regime draws a sharp division between European citizens and non-
European “third country” residents, the treatment of the Roma clearly shows that 
a formal European citizenship is not the only criteria for full access to either social 
and political rights in general or freedom of movement in particular. Cases of 
mass evictions and expulsions of Roma migrants from Italy and France in direct 
violation of the Free Movement Directive are but one more example (Hepworth 
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2012, Gehring 2013). European racism is highly ideologically charged, and it is 
both historically complex and often contradictory: it operates against both groups 
of “external” and “internal” origin, “who are typically lumped in with the 
confused or wilfully confusing category of immigrants or migrants” (Balibar 
2002:43). This includes e.g. the racism directed against postcolonial groups from 
within the former European empires, against the indigenous Sámi and the Roma, 
as well as against Eastern and Southern Europeans in the Northern and Western 
parts. Member states have also tried to manipulate the Schengen Agreement by 
temporarily closing their borders in order to exclude specific populations 
(Scuzzarello – Kinnvall 2013). 
Within the EU, it is well documented that the possibilities to migrate are 
structured by access to economic resources. This applies both to EU citizens and 
even more so to “third-country” citizens under the legal framework that demands 
proof of sufficient funds before granting permission to enter the Union or settle 
elsewhere in it. Even the ability to flee persecution and apply for asylum depends 
to a large extent on economic means to purchase tickets, bribe officials or 
purchase high-quality travel documents (Guild 2005:41). Under the EU blue card 
regulations, special rules apply to those foreigners who have a highly qualified 
employment requiring specialist competence through at least 180 university 
credits or five years of experience, and who will earn at least one and a half time 
the national average gross yearly salary (SFS 2005:716, chap. 6a §1). The 
differentiated possibilities of mobility based on economic resources brings to 
mind Zygmunt Bauman’s argument that under globalisation, the main division is 
between the rich who have freedom to move and the poor who are trapped in the 
local (Bauman 1998). This does not mean, however, that the rich are not at all 
under surveillance or that the poor do not move: they do move nevertheless, and 
by doing so they restructure relations of power both at the global scale between 
rich and poor countries, and by blocking the possibility for anyone to manage all 
the individual decisions to move (Bigo – Guild 2005:3). Following Foucault, if 
one understands the control as an expression of power, there must also always be 
a resistance to it, which in this case it is evident that there is: the very presence of 
the irregular, illegalised migrants is an act of resistance against the system that 
seeks to prevent, exclude and expel them.  
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5 Borders reconfigured 
Understanding migration as “individuals crossing borders” involves the state’s 
categorisation of these individuals as varyingly citizens and non-citizens, legal or 
illegal. As the previous chapter demonstrated, these categorisations are not 
straightforward but rather highly politically charged and often complex and 
contested. The understanding of migration as border crossing also depends on the 
notion of a system of states as sovereign entities with corresponding territories 
and clear borders in between. In debates on globalisation, a returning issue is 
whether we are moving towards “borderlessness” or if borders are more important 
than ever for reassertions of territorial sovereignty. Both sides of the debate seem 
to take the concept of the border itself rather for granted, and, as Nick Vaughan-
Williams argues there has been a general lack of theorising the idea of “border” 
itself (Vaughan-Williams 2012:4-5). This chapter discusses internal control of 
foreigners through various ways of conceptualising contemporary borders, and 
argues that a lens of sovereign exceptionalism is not the most productive reading, 
as it is more usefully understood as part of a normalised and continuous network 
of governmentality and control. 
5.1 Internal control as border control 
Internal control of foreigners can be articulated as a form of border control, 
though detached from the geographical borderline. In the case under study, this is 
done most clearly in a 2004 report commissioned by the Swedish government to 
evaluate the Swedish application of the Schengen Acquis from the perspective of 
preventing and fighting crime and in a migration perspective, as well as to 
evaluate the order for control of persons at the borders. The report suggested a 
new single border control act, which would also include internal control of 
foreigners (SOU 2004:110). In this report, internal control of foreigners is 
articulated as a form of border control that must be intensified when Sweden in 
principle no longer has an external border after the addition of Poland and the 
Baltic States to the Schengen Area. The report also argues for extending the 
mandate of internal control to include the crime of human trafficking, which 
would mean it could also target Swedish citizens suspected for involvement in 
trafficking. Neither this suggestion nor the Border Control Act was enacted, and 
the text is not a nodal point for later discourse. The report is interesting in how it 
articulates internal control as border control in connection with an obvious both 
securitisation and criminalisation of immigration, an example of a very explicit 
securitisation making a reappearance in a post-9/11 context.  
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The report understands violations of the Aliens Act as being cross-border 
crime in itself, which makes it appear particularly grave and linked to the most 
dangerous of crimes against society: ”cross-border crime includes obvious 
examples like terrorism, trafficking and smuggling of narcotics and other 
contraband, but also any crime where there is a cross-border element, e.g. 
perpetrators being non-residents, but using Swedish territory as a part of a 
criminal endeavour.” (SOU 2004:110, p. 26). It also criminalises migration more 
generally, by commissioning and discussing statistics on suspected and prosecuted 
perpetrators of crime divided into Swedish citizens, foreign citizens with 
residence permits and foreign citizens without connections to the country. In 
addition, it uses statistics on the number of persons with “foreign background” in 
custody and in prisons, as well as on “the connection between the number of 
asylum seekers and the number of crimes committed” (SOU 2004:110, p. 52). 
There is a discursive slippage between “foreign citizen” and “person with foreign 
background” here, that also serves to make suspicious the Swedish citizens who 
do not belong to the ethnic majority. And no matter what the results of the 
statistical survey turned out to be, asking the question in terms of the extent of the 
connection sets it up as objective that there is a connection of some kind between 
asylum seekers and criminality. Invoking the thesis of the “criminal migrant” 
works as a “security short-circuit” that renders immigration synonymous with 
insecurity (Tsoukala 2005:171). In short, articulating internal control as border 
control does not de-link it from securitising discourses, but rather emphasises the 
connection. The next section places the articulation of internal control as border 
control within the context of European border control policies and 
conceptualisations of contemporary borders. 
5.2 Shifting European borders 
Borders today are vacillating and no longer unequivocally localizable, according 
to Étienne Balibar. Instead of marking the limit where politics ends because the 
community ends, they are being multiplied, thinned out and doubled within the 
space of the political itself (Balibar 2002:91-92). Changing borders and border 
control in various ways is and has been central to the increasing cooperation 
between EU member states, connected to the idea of the common market and free 
movement; the removal of internal borders and the strengthening of the external 
borders. How this development can be understood in terms of security and the 
imperative of circulation was discussed in chapter 3. Focusing on the borders and 
border controls specifically, these changes can be categorised in various ways, all 
centred around a shift away from routinized manual control of every individual 
crossing the border to a more differentiated control that also reaches further from 
the moment of crossing the territorial border, both in time and space. One way 
border controls in the EU can be divided is into three main kinds: external, 
internal and externalised. The external controls include fortifications and 
involvement of military particularly at the southern European borders. The 
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internal control includes the compensatory measures required by the Schengen 
convention, and for instance the Swedish internal control of foreigners. The 
externalised controls have been growing quickly in importance across the EU in 
the past decade, including the visa requirements, carrier liability and sanctions, 
and pre-departure checks of various kinds. (Doomernik – Jandl 2008:204-205) 
Externalised control can also be understood as an “off-shoring” of the border, 
including for instance the joint operations and surveillance activities of the EU 
border agency Frontex in the Mediterranean and into Northern Africa, which 
pushes the border further out from the European territory, attempting to 
discourage would-be migrants before they start their journey. These pre-emptive 
measures take the border control directly to the populations they deem to be the 
biggest threat. (Vauhan-Williams 2012:24-28)  
Even before Frontex was operational, the external Schengen borders were seen 
more as frontier zones than as simple lines (Salter 2005:82). These frontier zones 
such as the Greek border with Turkey are the location for “push-backs”, when 
groups of migrants are pushed back by e.g. coast guards before they ever reach the 
border, preventing them from crossing and exercising their right to apply for 
asylum, and often putting their lives severely at risk (Amnesty International 
2014). Amnesty International does not consider that they have enough evidence to 
claim that the push-backs are systematic in the sense of being an official policy, 
but there is no doubt that they are connected to the EU migration regime and the 
increasing pressure put on southern European states to more effectively prevent 
poor migrants from entering the European territory by crossing their long external 
borders. The bordering regime in the EU can then be understood as a 
simultaneous movement outwards and inwards, where the internal control is set 
up as a counterpart to the externalised control. The current bordering regime also 
contains a spreading out of the control in time, instead of centring only on the 
moment of border crossing. This is reminiscent of what Bigo calls policing at a 
distance and a dis-time; the post-9/11 pre-crime approach where police try to 
anticipate the actions of categories of the population profiled as would-be 
criminals (Bigo 2011b:110). The temporal shift in border control is not only about 
prevention: the internal control of foreigners shows how control is also extended 
in time after the moment of border crossing: the legality of the stay of the non-
citizen is to be continuously monitored, placed under permanent suspicion of 
transgressing the conditions of their permit. 
The bordering work of internal control of foreigners is a spreading out of the 
securitised border control situation all over the geographical space of the country, 
into scenes of everyday life. It shows clearly how surveillance and registration are 
socio-technical systems, where the advanced biometric databases meet the gaze 
and continual judgements of the police officer in everyday interactions. These 
judgements of potential risk/illegality are both gendered and racialised in specific 
ways, as when intelligence-led profiling interacts with everyday stereotyping in 
border control (Pickering – Ham 2014). Internal control of foreigners attempts to 
effectively sort out the unwanted, undocumented residents, but as the counter-
discourses demonstrate the control often also catches permanent residents or 
citizens, thus policing the boundaries of the national community by marginalising 
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racialised members through placing them under permanent suspicion. There are 
various ways of theorising the way the contemporary border becomes detached 
from the geographical border lines and moves into the social spaces of the 
country: the “smart border” (Salter 2004), the “biometric border” (Amoore 2006, 
Epstein 2007, Muller 2011), and the generalised biopolitical border (Vaughan-
Williams 2012). The notion of the smart or biometric border draws attention to 
how contemporary bordering practices turn to technology to manage risks and to 
make sorting wanted from unwanted mobility more efficient, in particular by 
making use of biometric systems. 
Biometrics includes fingerprints, photographs, facial recognition systems, etc., 
and is often conceived in positivist terms as the most objective way of securely 
establishing identifications. The genealogies of these systems can be traced back 
to colonial and race-biological enterprises to measure, register, identify and 
predict the behaviour of individuals and groups. Neither are the biometrical 
systems of today neutral, but rather embedded in a dominant conception of the 
normative body: as e.g. white, able, heterosexual and cis-gendered. Individuals 
who do not live up to these characteristics may be categorised as more suspicious 
by the built-in biases of the systems, or fail to enrol and be registered entirely and 
therefore always subjected to manual control. (Introna – Wood 2004, Pugliese 
2012) This is then one of the ways biopolitics is enacted in the 21st century. 
Biometrics, as all governmental techniques, are best understood as socio-technical 
systems, where code and technical solutions interact with protocols, trainings, 
conventions and so on, and which are put to work micro-politically (Dillon 
2011:171-196). In the contemporary technologized security environment, 
biometrics is accepted as the ultimate technology to identify people with certainty, 
in the EU employed both through the surveillance databases such as Eurodac, the 
Visa Information System, the SIS II, and through the introduction of biometric 
features in passports and identity documents for all citizens (Ceyhan 2008:114-
115).  
In accordance with a EU directive (EG 1030/2002), the Swedish Aliens Act 
requires that biometric data in the form of a photograph and finger prints be saved 
in residence permit cards. Anyone who holds a residence permit is required to 
allow a passport officer, a police officer or an officer from Customs, the Coast 
Guard or the Migration Board to take their photograph and fingerprints in order to 
control that they match the ones saved in the residence permit. After the control, 
the biometric data collected must be immediately destroyed (SFS 2005:716 chap. 
9 §8a-8b). Since 2009 Swedish passports must also contain biometric information 
(SFS 1978:302 §5-6). There is an increasing preoccupation with securely 
establishing identities in relation to asylum processes, enforcement of expulsions 
and internal control of foreigners, evidenced e.g. in the Swedish Government 
tasking the Migration Board and the National Police Board yearly in 2009-2014 
with more effectively ensuring that identity is established as early as possible in 
asylum processes, and that identity information is available when a case is 
transferred to the Police. In some cases, lacking trusted identity documents is 
made equivalent with having an unclear identity that the authorities must 
establish, or lacking identity entirely: the problem with “identitetslösheten” (SOU 
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2004:433), an odd compound word that can be loosely translated as the state of 
being without identity. Lacking papers then comes to mean being unidentifiable 
and thereby making the process of acquiring a legal status impossible. There is a 
concern with authenticity and a fear of fraud and falsifications, shown also by the 
focus on identifying false documents through technical expertise and international 
cooperation in the Swedish Police’s internal education on internal control 
(Sambandet 2012). Thus, internal control can be understood as not focused on the 
migrants’ identity as such, but on “scanning their bodies for signs of 
(il)legitimacy” (Ajana 2013:12). Connected to an obsession with sorting authentic 
from inauthentic, “bogus fraudster” from “legitimate claimant” in asylum 
processes, in biometric technologies the body functions as a “password” that 
mediates access to “rights, bodies, spaces, and so forth” when both identity and 
citizenship is securitised (Muller 2004:280, 288). The preoccupation with 
authenticity also hides the exclusionary and discriminatory character of biometric 
identity management and citizenship (Ajana 2013:13). Internal control is not, 
however, only occupied with controlling borders and identities through 
technology.  
RPSFS 2011:4 §5 includes that “the foreigner’s conduct and the company they 
keep may be grounds for control”. This brings us back to biopolitics, but from the 
angle of the need to guard against those abnormal in behaviour. When the 
population becomes increasingly heterogeneous, basing controls only on external 
physical characteristics, such as skin colour, “would not only be discriminatory 
but also less and less effective over time” (SOU 2004:340). In this, internal 
control shows its bordering function as being not only a technological biometric 
anchoring of identities and rights in the physical body, but also relying on 
performances of belonging and identity in public spaces. Apparently, one can 
behave as a “citizen” or as a “foreigner”, pointing to how notions of community 
rely on shared cultural modes of behaviour. This can be read through Vaughan-
Williams’ concept of the generalised biopolitical border, an analysis that draws on 
Giorgio Agamben’s work to show how “border performance is also a body 
performance”, and how “borders are continually (re)inscribed through mobile 
bodies that can be risk assessed, categorised, and then treated as either trusted 
citizen travellers or bare life” (Vaughan-Williams 2012:134).  
Bare life, homo sacer, is excluded from politically qualified life and banned 
into a zone of indistinction not simply beyond the law, but abandoned by it on the 
threshold of order and inside/outside (Agamben 1998:40). Agamben’s “sovereign 
ban” is part of the current theorising of exceptionalism, following Carl Schmitt’s 
understanding of sovereignty as the capacity ‘to decide upon the exception’ 
(quoted in Walker 2006:73). The generalised biopolitical border moves the 
sovereign decision on which life is worthy of protection from the geopolitical 
border of the state and into social spaces anywhere (Vaughan-Williams 2012:114-
116). One can question how much the generalised biopolitical border’s 
differentiation between politically qualified life and bare life actually tells us 
about what life is like for those who fear deportation or are deported, for the 
undocumented migrants and stateless, as “these are not undifferentiated instances 
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of ‘bare life’ but rather highly juridified states of dispossession” (Butler – Spivak 
2010:42). 
There is also a critique to be made of the tendency to see a generalised 
exception as “the state of emergency in which we live […] as a form of prolonged 
state of exception” (Bigo, quoted in Vaughan-Williams 2012:11). The debate on 
exceptionalism following Schmitt and Agamben runs the risk of reifying and 
naturalising exceptions and exceptionalism by considering them “latent structural 
inevitabilities” of liberal democracy. Andrew W. Neal draws on Butler’s (2004) 
analysis that “instead of considering sovereign exceptionalism as a product of the 
always-already-securitised ‘limit’, Butler theorises exceptionalism as the 
instrumental manipulation of law as a ‘tactic’” (Neal 2011:47). By understanding 
exceptionalism as an innovative modality of government, constituted and 
normalised through performative repetition, the necessity of the exception is 
moved from deterministic structural limits to particular political choices and 
practices (Neal 2011).  
That exceptionalism can be usefully understood as a tactical discourse and 
practice does not mean that it is the best way of theorising the border in internal 
control of foreigners. Butler’s (2004) argument relates specifically to Guantanamo 
Bay and the Bush government’s use of exception in the context of the ‘war on 
terror’. In the Swedish policy and discourse on internal control of foreigners, 
rather than a focus on states of emergency and exceptional practices, there is an 
emphasis on achieving “a migration politics that is humane, following rule of law 
and ordered” (Regeringen – Miljöpartiet 2011). In other words, while the control 
is securitised, as previously discussed, it does not follow that it is articulated as or 
governed through the tactic of exceptionalism: rather the securitised control is 
normalised and considered necessary for and part of a humane and ordered 
migration politics.  
For Vaughan-Williams, the main theoretical problem with the generalised 
biopolitical border is that it still relies on an inside/outside way of thinking, where 
one is always only one or the other. Drawing on Derrida’s way of deconstructing 
the binaries of Western thought, he then suggests a theorisation of borders as 
“frames of intelligibility” that secure an inside from an outside, thus 
understanding the concept of the border itself as operating as a discourse of the 
limit between outside and inside. The generalised biopolitical border is then 
simply an alternate framework, with distinct political implications from the 
classical frame of the geopolitical border of the state (Vaughan-Williams 
2012:145-158). 
The practice of internal control of foreigners draws attention to how the 
bordering function is extended in both time and space into society. It attempts to 
secure the community – and the identity of the community – by policing that 
belonging is appropriately performed. This is connected to and intertwined with a 
range of processes of governmentality in the use of profiling, large-scale 
surveillance, biometric registration in identity documents and databases in the 
complex biopolitics of migration control and border politics.  
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6 Conclusion 
The shifting sorting functions of the borders in the European migration regime, 
one of which is the internal control of foreigners, should not simply be understood 
as a brute racist sorting of white from not-white, European from non-European. It 
is more complicated and operates in complex and sometimes insidious ways. 
Sometimes that sorting does take expression through violent exclusions, 
restricting access to legal entryways and letting migrants drown while attempting 
to cross the Mediterranean. However, it also involves a complicated sorting of the 
already European population, differentiated by economic means, social class, 
education, national and ethnic belonging and majority/minority status, through 
classification of their potential productive contributions to society as residents, 
through categorisations of dangerousness or suspicious behaviour in digital tracks 
or under the watchful eye of a police officer in the street. This is one reason not to 
read internal control only in abstract terms as a rejection of the Other or of 
“otherness as such”. As Étienne Balibar cautions, that risks reproducing the racist 
discourse itself (Balibar 2002:44). “The Other” is not a monolith, not a clearly 
definable entity with essential characteristics that is possible to effectively once 
and for all reject and expulse.  
As the preceding chapters have shown, internal control of foreigners in 
Sweden today is deeply integrated into a common European framework, where 
intensified external border control and internal (border) policing are understood as 
fundamental for ensuring the security of the territory and population, and in turn 
securing and demanding freedom of movement. In a Foucauldian reading, security 
and freedom, circulation and control appear as co-constitutive, producing one 
another. Within the Schengen cooperation and the European Union the internal 
control of foreigners is articulated as a compensatory measure for the abolishment 
of the “internal borders” between member states, thereby making the control itself 
appear fundamentally European in nature, securing the freedom of movement for 
European citizens by intensifying the surveillance and control of the potentially 
dangerous non-Europeans. Internal control as a compensatory measure is then 
made necessary through a taken for granted relation between freedom, security 
and control, where the freedom to move is a desirable value in itself that must be 
protected from various threatening side effects and secured through intensified 
control. Internal control becomes a securitised and securitising practice through its 
incorporation into the deeply securitised European migration and border control 
regime, both if we understand securitisation as primarily speech acts in the 
Copenhagen School sense, and in a more critical sense as part of a continuum of 
(in)security, and in the Foucauldian understanding of security as the biopolitical 
imperative operationalized governmentally.  
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However, a genealogical reading also makes it evident that Swedish internal 
control of foreigners was an existing national practice with deep historical roots in 
nationalist politics with explicitly eugenic biopolitical aims. When this control is 
rearticulated as a European practice, it can be made to appear newly necessary 
with reference to changing circumstances. This makes it simultaneously possible 
to intensify and extend the control and to bypass and silence its historical roots 
and its specific exclusions, such as the targeting of the Roma. When the internal 
control of foreigners is read as specifically Swedish, it also brings into focus the 
differentiation in the Swedish law and policies on the control between the Swedish 
citizen and the foreigner. The Swedish citizen is the subject who is exempt from 
control, who is to be protected and secured. Who the foreigner is comes into focus 
as historically contingent and contested – and how the foreigner is constituted in 
turn determines the boundaries of the citizen. As discussed in chapter four, the 
Swedish Roma minority appear more foreign than citizens of other Nordic 
countries. In the Schengen regulations the truly foreign is always a non-European, 
but the member states do in varying ways attempt to get around it to be able to 
control and exclude the “less desirable” Europeans, such as the French and Italian 
mass expulsions of Roma and the Austrian control focused on Eastern Europeans. 
The deeply Eurocentric binary division between the citizen and the foreigner 
hides the complex and highly political boundary drawing behind who is included, 
excluded or expelled from the community and the territory. The counter 
discourses on internal control of foreigners that articulate the control as 
discriminatory racial profiling draw attention to the way citizens get caught up in 
the control. This then makes evident how internal control of foreigners also 
attempts to control the citizens, or at least some of them: by drawing a line 
between those whose belonging is never in question and those who continually 
have to prove themselves as on the right side of the legal boundary. Through this, 
we also see how internal control of foreigners acts as a complex bordering 
practice that requires continuous bodily performances of identity and belonging. It 
challenges the ways ‘border’ is theorised through its simultaneous use of complex 
technological surveillance and normalised, everyday policing reliant on the police 
officers tacit knowledge and stereotypes of ‘the foreigner’s’ identity and 
behaviour. This calls for further study of how the forms of this belonging and the 
inclusions/exclusions of the community is (re)negotiated through performative 
resistance and political uses of hybridity.  
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